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I ABSTRACT
 
The history oturban policing paints an evolutionary picture describing the
 
i ' ■ 
variousforces that injipinged on society's earliest efforts at public policing and led to
 
numerousreforms ciilminating in what has been termed the professional model of
 
i ' . .
 
!
 
policing. The dynaniics ofan ever-changing urban society continued to presentnew
 
challenges to policing and have driven police administrators and politicians to seek new
 
methodsofresponding to society's criminal element. The evolution continuestoday

I ■ ■ ■ . . , 
with our latest response to the problem ofcrime;namely,Community Oriented
 
Policing. Byfar the mostpopular movementin policing today,COP attempts to change
 
the very culture ofthe modem urban police departmentthrough a stmctural as well as
 
functional reorganization ofthat department. The goal isto tighten the bonds between
 
• i ■ • ' ■ ■ 
police officer and citijzen thereby involving conmumity residents in solving their 
, . ■ . i ' ■ ■ , 
particular neighborhood problems. Initial results depicta broad mix ofsuccesses with
 
intermittentfailures; yet,the movementcontinues to gain popularity in nearly all
 
quarters including memy ofthe nation's Air Force communities. While numerous
 
installations begin iniplementing componentsofCOP,there is someconcem they are
 
doing so without questioning the applicability ofCOPin the military community.
 
Several unique characteristics ofthe Air Force community diminish the need for COP
 
while atthe same timje making those communities idealfor implementation ofCOP
 
tactics. In particular,Ithe strong informal social controls existing at mostAF
 
installations strongly reduce the need forformal police controls. An exploratory survey
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suggests that while many Air Force Security Police units are committed to COP,the
 
individuals working the programs may notfully imderstand all thatCOP entails or that
 
Air Force SP units actually began performing many community oriented services years
 
before the COP movementtook hold. Further research into which areas ofCOP would
 
benefitthe military community the mostand which programs are not necessary is
 
recommended. Additionally,close monitoring ofcivilian programs and efforts at
 
community policing,especially those in rural America is encouraged.
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 Chapter 1
 
The Enduring Problem ofCrime
 
It wasonce noted that"crime should have been added to death and taxes as
 
inevitable facts oflife(Stephens,1992,p. 19)." Indeed,the problem ofcrime seemsto
 
be as enduring as humankind itself. While one need notsearch very far before
 
uncovering ample evidence of the perpetual nature ofcriminal activity, historically
 
speaking,our responses to crime have varied widely over time,and as Sherman(1995)
 
points out,the phenomenon weknow as police patrolling wasrelatively unknown
 
during the pastthousand years and before the substantial police reforms ofearly British
 
police history,citizens,in oneform or another,generally policed themselves. In spite of
 
historical facts such as these, it is easy to understand how Americanstoday,who have
 
known no other system ofcriminaljustice,assume thatthe modemimage ofpolicing,
 
■ ■ . ' ' ' • 0 ■ ■ ' ' ' 
perpetuated and stereotyped in the media,is as abiding as crime itself. In the questfor
 
crime control, responseshave been varied and often hastily concocted in response to
 
some pressing critical issue—only to be repudiatedjust as quickly when results were
 
notspeedily forthcoming. One analogy offered compares society's responses to the
 
crime problem to thatofcrash dieting.Every now and then,someone touts a new
 
"miracle cure"which turns outto be anything buta cure,and in mtoy cases only serves
 
to exacerbate the problem(Walker,1994;p. 12). Whetherthe solution is selective
 
incapacitation,determinate sentencing,a war on crime, aw^on drugs,or any one ofa
 
number ofcontemporary solutions to the crime problem, our responsesseem more like
 
crisis managementthan thoughtfully proposed and researched programs ofcrime
 
fighting(Byrne,Lurigio, &Petersilia, 1992).
 
Politicians and police practitioners themselves are partly to blame for this
 
fi-enzied search for a solution to the crime problem. Aspointed outby Cochran(1992),
 
a staple ofmostpolitician's running platforms is to"gettough on crime"which,of
 
course,inaplies that we are not yettough enough. In addition,getting tough usually
 
implies attempting newlaw enforcementtechniques,reducing the number of
 
"technicalities"which may be used by criminal defense lawyers,adding more police to
 
the streets,or otherwise"unleashing the cops,"none ofwhich,research has shown,will
 
do much to reduce the crirne problem(Walker,1994). Others have pointed outthat
 
police administrators have become quite adeptat burning the candle at both ends;that
 
is,both rising as well as falling crime rates have long been successfully used by police
 
administratorsasjustification for more police funding in spite ofthe factthat available
 
research hasshownthatpolice,in and ofthemselves,cannotdo much aboutthe crime
 
problem(Willimns,F.P.Ill, & Wagoner,C.P., 1992). While one would suspectthat
 
people Would eventually realize that mostcrime repression programs have had little
 
effecton die crime problem,Gochrah(1992)points outthatthe symbolic nature ofeach
 
new program overshadowsthe lack ofsubstance with the previous programs. It is
 
suggested that,aslong as politicians and practitioners keep churning outnew laws and
 
programsfaster than the failings ofpast programs can be comprehended,the end to the
 
furious search for an effective response willremain outofsight.
 
Community Oriented Policing: Our Latest Response
 
When itcomesto law enforcement,the response to crime drawing the mostattention
 
over the pastseveral years is Community Oriented Policing(COP). It has been"touted
 
asthe onlyform ofpolicing available for anyone who seeks to improve police
 
operations,management,or relations with the public"(Rosenbaum&Lurigio, 1994).
 
In addition, as Rosenbaum,Yeh,and Wilkinson(1994)have pointed out,it would seem
 
those critical ofthe change to community policing are becoming somewhatofan
 
endangered species as"police chiefs and public officials have stopped asking questions
 
and have startedjumping on the bandwagon"(p.331). Citing President Clinton's
 
Fiscal 1994 budget,which includes$50 million for state and local government
 
implementation ofCOP programs,Roberg(1994)points outthat even though there is
 
little, ifany,hard,empirical evidence thatCOP reduces crime,it"appears to be a done
 
deal"(p.254). Results from aNational Center For Community Policing 1993 survey
 
support these conclusions by demonstrating that42percentofall large departments
 
(those servingjurisdictions of50,000 or more)and 98 percent ofsmall departments
 
surveyed(those servingjurisdictions ofless than 50,OOO)reported having some kind of
 
COP program(Trojanowicz,1994). More recentstatistics show thatthe movement's
 
popularity is growing unabated: DepartmentofJustice,NIJ,figuresshow that atthe
 
end of1994, outof15,000 departments which servejurisdictions of50,000 or more,a
 
full 9,000 applied for federal funding in supportoftheir ongoing or planned community
 
policing programs. Certainly, Kelling's(1988)commentsaboutCOP being a"...
 
quietrevolution[which]is reshaping American policing"seem righton target(p. 1).
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This"quietrevolution"has notgone unnoticed by the nation's military leaders
 
either. Ever vigilantin detecting evolving police technologies or procedures which may
 
benefit military communities. US Air Force(USAF)Security Police commanders have
 
already implemented components ofCOP at various military installations throughout
 
the country. More are planned for the future,and while this interestin COP is certainly
 
laudable,assuming it has merit as an effective response to the crime problem,there is
 
some risk involved injumping on the COP bandwagon without prior assessmentofits
 
need or applicability within the USAF community. For one,as more and more USAF
 
Security Police(SP)units feelthe need to getin line with the growing movement,some
 
ofthese units will undoubtedly attemptto do so even though they may be less-than­
adequately equipped to successfully manage the necessary changes. Because the
 
existing research on community policing's effectiveness already constitutes a mixed
 
bag,continued program failures,outside ofor within the military community,could
 
prove problematic for the movement's life expectancy. The result may be program
 
abortions even though failures maystem from poor implementation strategies rather
 
than from the use offaulty concepts.
 
Prohlem Statementand Overview
 
Before any USAF SPcommander embarkson a questto implementcommunity
 
policing it would seem wise to assessthe logical fit ofcommunity policing with the
 
military community and its unique culture. Is the military already doing community
 
policing but under a different name? Whataspects ofcommunity policing are
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applicable to military communities? Doesthe philosophy underlying community
 
policing mesh with thatoftraditional military police work? To the extentthat
 
community policing would require structural changes within departments,is the military
 
ready or able to implementthe necessary changes? How much change is required by
 
community policing in USAFSP departmental culture and philosophy in order to be
 
successful in the military? Whatcommunity policing programs could be effectively
 
used by military commanders? Finally,are there any lessons to be learned from
 
military policing programs and philosophy which would benefit civilian departments as
 
they endeavor to implementcommunity policing? These constitutejustsome ofthe
 
questions which need to be addressed in order to afford any community policing effort
 
the best possible chance for success.
 
In an attemptto answerthe foregoing questions,three areas ofconcem for
 
USAF Security Police(SP)commandersand leaders will be explored in an effortto
 
determine the potential value ofCOPfor military communities as well as identify any
 
possible risks or other areas ofparticular concem. First, the question ofa need for a
 
complete philosophical shift to COP within the USAF military community environment
 
will be addressed. Next,the overall fit ofthe COP model ofpolicing and the military
 
policing model will be exeimined to see if some restructuring emd reculturalization of
 
the military police organization is necessary before COP has any chance ofsuccessful
 
implementation. Finally,the possibility ofasegmented implementation ofCOP in the
 
military community will be explored;that is,an attempt will be made to determine
 
which components,ifany,ofCOP havethe greatest applicability(and,hence the
 
greatest chance for success)in the military environment.
 
Chapter Two will provide an overview ofour traditional modelofpolicing
 
including an analysis ofthe driving forces which forged(and are continuing to forge)
 
this model. Chapter Three willfocus on the COP model beginning with a description
 
ofsome ofthe major motivating forces and following with a definition ofCOP as well
 
asa briefreview ofseveral contemporary efforts. It is hoped that this portrait ofCOP
 
will clearly illustrate the magnitude ofthe effort level required for atrue shiftin
 
departmentalculture prerequisite to full implementation ofCOP. In Chapter Four,a
 
sketch ofthe tradition ofmilitary policing will be presented,focusing on its roots,
 
mission,and similarities(as well as dissimilarities)with the traditional modelof
 
policing. In addition,the question ofaneed for COP in the Air Force will be addressed
 
focusing onthe unique environmentofthe military community. The major reasons why
 
COP may have some implementation problems will be discussed along with some
 
considersations which might be addressed in pursuing COP implementation in the Air
 
Force. Fihally,an outline ofthe results ofsome exploratory research into whatis
 
currently being done at severalUSAF bases with respectto COP will be presented. The
 
examples presented willfurther demonstrate how a selective application ofCOP in the
 
military community may be the method mostlikely to meet with success. Chapter
 
Five will summarize the research and include some discussion about,and
 
recommendationsfor, future inquiry and research.
 
Methodology and Limitations
 
A literature review will provide historical and contemporary information
 
concerning the developmentand current status of the various philosophies ofpolicing.
 
A number ofwriters have elaborated on the roots ofcontemporary policing,beginning
 
with the British foundations and continuing with the American adaptations. These
 
writers discuss the political,economical,and social forces ofthe times which served as
 
catalysts for change(Crank,1994; Critchley,1967; Moore&Kelling,1983; Sherman
 
1995; Silver, 1967; Sparrow,Moore,&Kennedy,1990; Trojanowicz&Bucqueroux,
 
1990). Similarly,the literature is replete with explanations ofthe forces which have,in
 
part,helped to shape the currenttrend toward community policing(Crank,1994; Eck&
 
Rosenbaum,1994; Roberg,1994; Rosenbaum&Lurigio,1994; Turner& Wiatrowski,
 
1995).
 
While Trojanowicz&Bucqueroux(1990)stand outas leaders in defining
 
community oriented policing,there are numerous others who address the issues of
 
philosophy and definitions(Brown,1989; Capowich&Roehl,1994; Greene&
 
Decker,1989; Kratcoski&Dukes,1995;Rosenbaum&Lurigio,1994; Sparrow,1988;
 
Sparrow,Moore,&Kennedy,1990; Walker,1994;). In addition to describing or
 
attempting to explain whatcommunity policing entails,others,meanwhile,have also
 
focused on evaluation ofexisting programs as well asthe myriad ofimplementation
 
issues associated with changing a well-ingrained police culture(Brown,1989;
 
Capowich&Roehl,1994; Greene&Decker,1989; Greene,Bergman,&McLaughlin,
 
1994;Kratcoski&Dukes,1995; McLaughlin&Donahue,1995; Moore,1994;
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Murphy,1988; Rosenbaum&Lurigio,1994;Sadd &Grinc,1994; Skolnick&
 
Bayley,1988;Thurman&Bogen,1993; Walker,1994; Weisel& Eck,1994;
 
Wilkinson&Rosenbaum,1994; Wycoff&Skogan,1994). Finally,the concept of
 
community and its inherentlimitations with regard to an organized response to crime is
 
addressed by Buerger(1994).
 
Because there remains some ambiguity surrounding community policing and its
 
precise definition,any material presented and conclusions drawnfrom that material will
 
necessarily be based on the definitiori presented by the author for this work. With
 
regard to the history and tradition ofmilitary policing,the literature is scant;therefore,
 
many ofthe observations made concerning USAFSP traditions and practices are drawn
 
from the author'sown personal experience asaUSAF SP officer covering a period of
 
approximately nine years.
 
An exploratory survey will draw informationfrom USAF SP personnelto
 
formulate a picture ofwhat is being done todayregarding commuhity policing,in an
 
attemptto measurethe extent ofthe movement's popularity atthe unit level. This
 
survey will be conducted bytelephone and willconsistofasample drawn from the
 
population composed ofall USAFSP units within the continental United States. The
 
results ofthis survey should provide some useful examples ofwhatis currently being
 
done in various military police unitsor whatis projected for short-term implementation.
 
The survey results which will be used in the thesis are notintended to be a
 
representative example of all SP units. Differences in laws,customs,andjurisdictional
 
authority makes generalization beyond the United Statesimpossible,while differences
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between units' missions,locations,and headquarters-generated operational guidelines
 
makes comparison across units within the United States difficult as well. Therefore,the
 
nature and intent ofthe survey is to discover which(ifany)COP activities are being
 
performed by a variety ofunits, with the results used strictly for descriptive purposes.
 
In this work,no attempt is made to gauge the ability ofmilitary personnel(from
 
an aptitude or attitude perspective)to make the change to community oriented policing
 
or to unnecessarily compare the military with their civilian coimterparts in terms of
 
success probabilities. The differences between military and civilian police units,in
 
terms ofcomposition,mission,and environment,arejudged as being too greatto make
 
any realistically meaningful comparisons.
 
Chapter!
 
Traditional Policing
 
The traditional model ofpolicing(or professional model as it has been also
 
termed), has evolved over a number ofyears in response to a variety offactors.
 
Because the community policing model is somewhatofa natural outgrowth or
 
progression ofthe traditional model, we begin with a review ofthe traditional model
 
and briefly describe how itcame into being,including some ofthe mostsignificant
 
historical social,economic,technological, and political factors which influenced its
 
evolution.
 
From Public ServantTo Professional Crime Fighter:
 
The Evolution of the Traditional ModelofPolicing
 
The professional,or traditional model ofpolicing is characterized by a quasi-

military command and control structure which seeks to maximize the strengths ofpolice
 
officers as professional crime fighters. Thetypical modem police department is a
 
highly centralized organization where decision making is mostly vertical and uni
 
directional(top-down); bureaucratic in nature,it employs multiple levels ofsupervision
 
and management,detailed rules and prescriptive regulations,and seeksto packagejobs
 
into neat,simple sets ofspecific responsibilities. This stmcture and form of
 
managementhas as its primary purpose the unification ofefforttoward the commonly
 
defined goal ofcrime control. It also affords a strong mechanism for maintaining strict
 
accountability ofits officers,and is designed to promotethe type ofproductivity on
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which the relative successofthe organization is measured:numbers ofarrests,calls
 
handled,and containmentofPartIIndex Crime rates. The evolution ofthis structure
 
and the managementstyle which accompanies it solved a myriad ofproblemsfaced by
 
early American urban police departments. A briefreview ofsome ofthe major
 
developments which helped forge this traditional model ofpolicing will provide a better
 
understanding ofits underlying philosophy.
 
Public Policing: A New Response To An Old Problem
 
To the British ofthe time,the establishmentof the Metropolitan Police District
 
in 1829represented a profound divergence from the status quo. Previously, the
 
responsibility for policing rested primarily with the people themselves,who,relying on
 
asystem in which non-paid volunteers served as watchmen,would respond to the hue
 
and cry and band together in apprehending violators ofthe law. Citizens were grouped
 
together into tithes,hundreds, shires,and parishes and then held responsible forthe
 
capture ofcriminals who camefrom their various groups(Critchley, 1967). Asthe
 
country became more industrialized and the populations ofthe largest cities grew,crime
 
and disorder also increased and posed a greater set ofproblemsto citizens and industries
 
alike. In an effortto contain the criminal elementand minimize its impacton business,
 
various private police organizationsformed,the earliestofthese being Henry
 
Fielding'sBow Street Runners;however, being mostly reactionary in nature,the
 
Runners'success in investigating and solving crimes still hinged on public involvement
 
(Moore&Kelling,1983). Increasing urbanization and industrialization continued to
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exacerbate the crime problem as the population of the poor and seemingly lawless,
 
known asthe"dangerous classes," began to swellin the mosthighly populated cities.
 
After nearly a century ofattempted reform,society became increasingly alarmed
 
with,and aware of, the encroaching disorder and the ineffectiveness ofthe traditional
 
parish system.Thusthe stage was setfor change and a more radical response to the
 
crime problem. Silver(1967)points outthat complaints ofthe day regarding rising
 
crime and disorder in London were strikingly similar to the contemporary lamenting we
 
hear as people anguish over how bestto handle ourown urban crime problems. The
 
perception was that crime and disorder had simply taken On new dimensions and the
 
"traditional"methodsofthe time appeared inadequate to deal with them. Public
 
recourse in handling the problem left much to be desired: either rely on an ineffective
 
and fragmented system ofwatchmen and private police or turn to the militia which had
 
proven itself all too"bloodily effectual"in its past encounters with disorder(Sparrow,
 
Moore,&Kennedy,1990).
 
Againstthis setting ofdisorder and the sense ofdesperation for a solution to the
 
crisis. Sir RobertPeel broughtinto being the London Municipal Police Actof1829
 
which for the first time drew together the efforts Ofpolicing under one head in an
 
attemptto organize and professionalize the fight against crime. Critchley(1967)points
 
outthat Peel's task was notasimple one. The general citizenry and parliament had
 
vociferously resisted previous attempts at organizing police forces on the groundsthat
 
the conceptran counter to everything then believed abouta citizen's rightto liberty.
 
The factthatthe Act passed withoutany dissent(Trojanowicz&Bucqueroux,1990)
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suggests^ata pervasive beliefexisted that had to be done,some other
 
response wasneeded,with regard to die growing crime problem. Gritchley(1967)
 
continues,citing the convergence ofa variety offactors,over an extended period of
 
time,asleading up to the opportune momentfor passage ofthe Metropolitan Police Act.
 
These factors included the work ofthe Fielding brothersne^ly acentury earlier, which
 
raised the level ofawareness aboutcrime and its implications;the worksofColquhoun
 
and Bentham and the influence they had on public opinion; the lost confidence in the
 
existing parish system with its wholly incompetent watchmen;aPrime Minister
 
(Wellington)whofavored using police forces rather than conventional armytroops;and
 
the political opposition being"boughtoff(p.49). Silver(1967)notes that the change
 
wasseen as necessary and,in fact,was welcomed by mostofthe upper,or"propertied,"
 
class as it largely relieved them ofthe day-to-day responsibility for policing while still
 
allowing them control over who wasto be policed and how the policing wasto be done.
 
In addition,whatever fears the upper class may have had oflosing liberty atthe handsof
 
a public police force was more than offset by the increasing lack ofcivility on the part
 
ofthe"dangerous classes."
 
The newlyfounded response to crime wasnot without its problems and growing
 
pains;afact not surprising in light ofthe many obstacles and problemsfaced by the
 
fledgling"Met." The citizenry's general opposition to any formal organization ofa
 
police force wascompounded bythe fact that,as Trojanowiczand Bucqueroux(1990)
 
point out, many ofthe newly appointed constables camefrom the ranks ofthe old
 
watchmen and broughttheir corrupt practices with them. In addition to the disrespect
 
shown the police by the citizens,low paytended to magnify the temptations to give in
 
to corraption and also resulted in a high rate ofturnover. Finally, the sheer demandsof
 
thejob(keeping order in an environmentfull ofdisorder)further exacerbated the
 
problem ofmaintaining good workers. In the end,however, it wasthe Met's
 
persistence and demonstrated restraint(in contrastto the military mentality of"shoot
 
first,ask questions later"),and the eventual control ofthe"riotous element"which
 
caused public supportto eventually swing in favor ofthe Bobbies and allow this new
 
response to crime to continue developing.
 
America's Response: Following England's Lead
 
Ifthe British reformers had little in the way ofprecedent upon which to build
 
their police organizations,the colonists in America had even less,so it wasonly natural
 
that America's urban response to a growing crime problem was largely patterned after
 
the British response. Earlier efforts favored the watchman system and,asin England,
 
C. , ; ■ ■ . , ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ " 
this system soon became ineffective as urban Americans became afflicted with the same
 
problems endemic to urban London. Theformal effort to professionalize the police
 
force,then,generally followed London's lead,with one notable exception: The British
 
system was set up under a central office which reported to a memberofthe Prime
 
Minister's Cabinet,while the American police departments were set upimder individual
 
municipalities and therefore were less insulated from the corruptinginfluences oflocal
 
party politics'-^Not surprisingly,this vulnerability was exploited by politicians who
 
14
 
brazenly used the police as political tools in furthering their own ambitions and
 
agendas:
 
"Police chiefs came and went with mayors,precincts were laid outto be
 
contiguous with political wards,and precinctcaptains worked hand in hand with
 
ward leaders. Power within departments wasextremely decentralized,with
 
precinct captains directing,hiring,and firing their men,often atthe behestof
 
local party captains(whose frequent close connection with crime bosses often
 
meant that convicted felons ended up as police officers). Whenthe mayoralty
 
changed parties,it was notimusual for the entire police departmentto be fired
 
and replaced by supporters ofthe new victors." (Sparrow et al., 1990,p.33)
 
The opportunities for corruption were magnified by the factthat police officers
 
routinely carried out numerousfunctions,such as issuing licenses for a wide variety of
 
businesses,all ofwhich created a system where it was nearly impossible to avoid
 
corruption:"Even honestcops who where nottempted by monetary bribes could do
 
little to defy asystem where such licenses were dispensed as political favors
 
(Trojanowicz&Bucqueroux,1990, p.48)f Early American police thusfound
 
themselves wearing a variety ofhats depending onthe needs ofthe situation; withfew
 
other public agencies around,the police became the onesto turn to whenfaced with
 
nearly any problem,crime related or not. Whatever benefits may have been derived
 
from the service orientation ofthe early American police were soon overshadowed by a
 
growing sense ofuneasiness; that is,owing to the seemingly haphazard organizational
 
structure ofmost mid-1800s police departments and the instability oftheir political
 
supporters,people naturally questioned the authority ofthe police and eyed them with a
 
measure ofsuspicion(Moore&Kelling, 1983). Sparrow et al.(1990)likewise point
 
outthatin spite ofthe positive aspects ofthe police system in the middle to latter halfof
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the 19th century,the demand for police reform continued to grow as corruption and
 
abuses ofpower became increasingly widespread. Three ofthe more significant social
 
issues which spurred the early reform movementwere a perceived lack ofcrime control,
 
the view thatthe police were major obstacles in the way ofpoliticalreform,and the
 
perception ofmany thatthe"moral pollution" within the cities wasa direct result of
 
police refusal to enforce vice laws(Sparrow et al. 1990,p.34; Moore&Kelling, 1983).
 
Indeed,itseemed that police corruption became as significant a concern asthe crime
 
problem itself,thus setting the stage for continuing reform with regard to the way cities
 
were policed.
 
Whilethe reformers'developments gave the police morepowerin defining their
 
role and function in society as well as clarifying the response to crime,it did not give
 
them complete autonomy from political influence.Subsequent efforts atreform often
 
came inthe form ofblue ribbon panels whichfocused more on other aspects ofpolice
 
corruption. The Lexow commission in 1894 exposed some ofthe well-ingrained police
 
corruption in New York City,and these findings served asa catalystfor numerous other
 
commission investigations throughoutthe United States. Years later,the Wickersham
 
Commission further solidified reform efforts and, pointing to the lack ofcompetence
 
and training ofmost police officers,gave renewed motivation to the concept ofpolice
 
professionalization.' The dynamic efforts ofleaders like J.Edgar Hoover and August
 
Volmer helped formulate the frameworkfor what would come to be accepted asthe role
 
and function ofpolice in society. Hoover,especially,taughtreform-era administrators
 
the benefit ofdefining one's role and selling thatto the public rather than allowing
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others determine whatone's role should be(Trojanowicz&Bucqueroux,1990).
 
Technology(mostsignificantly the adventofthe patrolcar and mobile radios),the 911
 
system,and expanding use ofthe Uniform Crime Reports all continued to solidify the
 
image and role ofpolice as society's professional crime fighters and our first line of
 
defense(and offense)againstthe omnipresent problem ofcrime.
 
In short,industrialization andurbanization during the 19th and 20th centuries
 
created crime and disorder problems ofa magnitude and type never before encountered.
 
Traditional law enforcementresponses ofthe time simply were not effective and,once
 
the problems encountered grew sufficiently large enough to createafeeling that
 
something had to be changed,reforms were initiated. Later changes and modifications
 
to policing were similarly driven by the perception ofproblems which the existing
 
system did notseem to handle. Once the principle role ofcrime control wasformed,
 
and the Mageofthe professional crime fighter created,the police became less and less
 
involved with services and duties not directly related to law enforcement, and any
 
changes(including those teehnologically driven)were pursued largely in order to
 
enhance the police's ability to fitthatimage and enhance the organizational structure
 
and managementstyle which had been espoused. The overarching factor involved
 
throughoutthe various stages ofpolice reform has beenthe"need factor." Withouta
 
strong impetusfor change which this need factor provided,the reform efforts would
 
mostlikely have stalled,lacking the necessary momentum required to overcome the
 
considerable inertia presented by the reigning status quo.
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Chapter3
 
Turning Back To The Community
 
Some may argue thatcommunity policing is taking us back to policing's roots;
 
however,when viewing the history ofpolicing from an evolutionary perspective,one
 
senses that currenttrends appear to representa continuation ofthatevolution rather than
 
aswinging ofthe pendulum back to another era. While the changes that led to the
 
professional model ofpolicing were necessary and fitting for the time in which they
 
occurred,some ofthe professional model's inherent weaknesses became more apparent
 
overtime whenfaced with a perpetually changing environment. In particular,the rift
 
between the police and the public whom they served(which began to grow as patrol
 
officers moved from the foot beatto the car)grew wider asthe police and citizens
 
became increasingly distant and distrustful ofeach other(Moore&Relling, 1983). As
 
problems with police-community relations increased to crisis proportions,the search for
 
a response to this new problehi began to gain momentum.
 
Assuch,the ongoing search for alternatives to the professional model of
 
policing generally hasfollowed the same pattern ofchange witnessed during the early
 
reform years;that is,ftie current attempts atcommunity policing are in response to a
 
new setofchallenges resulting from some ineffectivenessoftraditional policing. Thus,
 
in a sense,perhapsthe community policing movementis multi-directional: In part,the
 
pendulum is swinging back to a day when patrol officers were moreinvolved,one-on­
one,with the citizens whom they serve;however,in another sense,policing is simply
 
proceeding with its evolution as society continues to grapple with the ever-growing and
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changing problem ofcrime control. A briefexaminationofthe more importantfactors
 
leading up to the current shifttoward commimity policing will help further clarifyjust
 
how public and political pressures combineto create an environment conducive to
 
change.
 
The Beginning ofThe End
 
Even asthe professionalization ofpolicing seemed to reach its zenith in terms of
 
rapid response and the crime fighter image reformers had worked so hard to create,the
 
public beganto question the effectiveness ofits police forces(Moore&Kelling, 1989).
 
Asidefrom the perception that crime was growing rampant during the 1960s, Crank
 
(1994)cites several concrete events which broughtthe legitimacy ofthe primary police
 
mission(protecting the public and fighting crime)under question. Crank includes(1)
 
increasing urban unrest and widespread protests ofthe Vietnam War,whichtended to
 
show a police force unprepared to handle these situations;(2)assassinations ofthe
 
Kennedy brothers and Martin Luther King,Jr.;(3)Chicago Police Department
 
shootings ofBlack Panther leaders;(4)the 1964and 1968 presidential elections,which
 
spotlighted the street crime issue for the first time on a national level;(5)the American
 
Bar Foimdation's study ofthe criminaljustice system,which was published in die
 
1960s and exposed a police force that did not apply the law in an equal maimer;(6)
 
Miranda and otherSupreme Court rulings,which bolstered the growing distrust ofa
 
police force perceived as abusive ofits discretionary power;(7)and,finally,the highly
 
publicized Kemer Commission and President's Crime Commission reports that
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summarized and formally stated many problems endemic to policing ofthe time while
 
atthe same time making an official call for drastic reform. The combination ofthese
 
factors created a crisis sufficiently strong that people began to .. question the
 
fundamental purpose ofthe[police]organization itself(Crank,1994,p.327).
 
Simileto the call for change which preceded police reform around the turn of
 
the century,the 1960s movementwas also based on a perception ofproblems within
 
policing and a perceived ineffectiveness ofcurrent police strategies. No single event
 
triggered these changes,rather it wasthe culmination ofnumerous incidents which
 
finally resulted in a sense pfcrisis and the perception ofa social problem significant
 
enough to demand change.; The President's Grime Commission findings and
 
recommendationsfor a shift in police strategy were based on data gleaned from
 
previous studies on policing and the impetus provided by the political and public
 
climate which were clamoring for change. This official call for change wasimportantif
 
for no other reason than it served as the catalystfor police introspection and further
 
research.
 
The President's Crime Commissions'callto turn the police back to the
 
communities by improving police-community relations spurred some practitioners to
 
seek alternative approachesin dealing with thejoint problemsofcrime and social
 
unrest. Someofthe earliest efforts involved Team Policing—a program designed to get
 
officers back on the beatand foster greater communication between officers and
 
community residents. HoWever,by and large,these efforts failed because ofmid-level
 
managementresistance and a general preoccupation on the partofthe police with what
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has been called a"meansover ends syndrome";that is,the police were more concerned
 
with appearingto be doing something in the way ofcommunity relations rather than
 
trying to actually solve some community problems(Roberg,1994; Rosenbaum&
 
Lurigio,1994;p.303). Mostother early attempts atimproving commimity-police
 
relations similarly failed becauseofinternal resistance vsdth departments only going
 
through the motions, or faulty implementation tied to a poor fit between organizational
 
structure and program implementation. Rather than investigate the reasonsfor poor
 
results, the tendency was to discreditthe entire idea;thus,early attempts at alternative
 
modelsfor policing became collateral casualties offailed demonstration projects
 
(Rosenbaum&Lurigio, 1994). Whateverthe causes ofthese failures,the tide of
 
change continued to move along,occasionally injected with new life from anecdotal
 
success stories or,more significantly,some highlypublicized events which again
 
focused on the negative aspectoftraditional policing and re-invigorated the cry for
 
change.
 
Continuing Changes
 
Ofthe more consequential events which keptthe ball rolling in the questfor
 
crime control alternatives were the Kansas City Preventive Patrol and Rapid Response
 
experiments ofthe early 1970s. While previous efforts atreform may have been
 
hampered by a less-than-enthusiastic cadre ofpolice administrators who dabbled with
 
change(at least,cosmetic change)as aresultofpolitical and media pressure,the results
 
ofthe Kansas City experiments virtually destroyed some ofthe more basic assumptions
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ofthe professional model and gave administrators even less reason to hang on to the
 
status quo(Turner& Wiatrowski,1995). The fact thatthe police operated for so long
 
assuming preventive patrol and rapid response to be the cornerstones ofpolicing(and,
 
hence,crime control)is not snrprising when one considers the underlying raison d'etre
 
for traditional patrol procedures. The prevailing style and procedures were adopted
 
primarily because they dovetailed so nicely with the accepted managementstyle,
 
organizational structure,and adopted role ofthe police departments and not because
 
they had been empirically tested and found to be effective. The impactofthe Kansas
 
City experiments wasthatthey narrowed downthe general complaints ofpolice
 
ineffectiveness and forthe first time objectively pointed to areas where police could
 
make changes. Their collective strengthlay notin exposing a new alternative,but
 
rather in demonstrating to jjractitioners and researchers alike what didn't work.
 
Whereas public opinion and commissionfindings generalized problems with policing
 
and indicated change was necessary,focused research proyided greater insight and
 
produced more internal motivation for police departmentsto make substmitive changes.
 
Some other events which continued to fuel the fire ofchange include the
 
continued politicization ofcrime broughtto center stage with catchy slogans such asthe
 
"War on Drugs"and the highlighting ofcases such as Willie Horton;media exposure
 
aboutcorruption or other problems in some prominent police departments
 
(Philadelphia,Los Angeles); and controversialpolice tactics such asthe"bombing"of
 
the MOVEheadquarters in Philadelphia and the Rodney King beating in Los Angeles.
 
In addition,while recentcommissionscharged with investigating urban police
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departments(Philadelphia in 1987and Los Angelesin 1991)cite the ineffectiveness of
 
traditional policing in dealing with the crime problem,the events which triggered the
 
investigations revolved around the use offorce(incidentally,againsta minority)and the
 
endless complaints aboutpolice in dealing with minorities(Eck&Rosenbaum,
 
1994).
 
Again,similarforces are seen as precipitating the change cycle: shifts in police
 
policy with regard to the appropriate function for police have been largely fueled by
 
significant events which capture the heartand imagination ofthe public. Where
 
research has been applied to changes in police strategy,it hasfollowed the cry for
 
change and has filled a more indirect,albeit an important,role by demonstrating what
 
doesn't work. Butmoving from whatdoesn't work to whatdoes work is much more
 
difficult—^both in the realm oftheory as well asin pructipe. Efforts in community
 
policing throughoutthe 1980s and into the'90s were grounded more in ideas and
 
anecdotal evidence than in any solid,theory-based rese^ch. Nevertheless,the
 
momentum grows unabated asfederalfunding for police initiatives is increasingly being
 
tied to community policing(U.S.DeptOf Justice Fact Sheet,1994)and COP continues
 
to wind its way downthe road to becoming a veritableinstitution(Crank,1994).
 
A Working Definition
 
Since thetime ofthe President's Crime Commission reports,there have been
 
numerousforays into aspects ofcommunity policing,some ofwhich have met with
 
success while others have failed. There has also been considerable confusion overjust
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whatconstitutes COP. Atthe center ofthe confusion is the predominate failure to
 
differentiate between strategy and tactics. While COPin its purestform encompassesa
 
complete philosophy^d therefore transcends tacticalprograms,these programs
 
nevertheless have captured mostofthe attention. Ofthe more enduring experiments
 
which have somehow survived the years oftrial and error and remainthe mostprevalent
 
in the literature, mini-stations,foot/bike patrol.Neighborhood Watch and other crime
 
prevention programs,civilianization,and permanentbeat assignmentofofficers are the
 
most well knownand used.
 
Tactical Programs
 
Mini-stations are perhaps the most direct effort at structural decentralization of
 
the police department. By bringing the police department directly to the affected
 
neighborhoods,the mini or sub-stations provide community residents with greater
 
access to the police. The underlying hope is to foster rapport,encourage citizen
 
involvement,and afford the police officers that have been assigned to the mini-station
 
greater familiarity with t/ic/r assigned beats (Trojanovdcz&Bucqueroux,1990).
 
While most mini-Stations are set up to operate in fixed structures,some cities have
 
experimented using converted vans thathavethe added advantage ofbeing able to move
 
throughoutthe cohimunity ona setrotation(Sadd&Grihc,1994). In both cases,
 
departments have solicited successfully for citizen volunteers who fulfill various
 
administrative tasks in the mini-stations.
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Similar to mini-stations,foot/bike patrols are used in an effortto bridge the gap
 
between patrol officers and community residents. The patrol officer onfoot or bicycle
 
becomes more accessible to the average citizen than the officer operating his/her patrol
 
vehicle. Likewise,once patrol officers are outoftheir vehicles,they are more likely to
 
solicit help from and engage in conversation with community residents.
 
Neighborhood Watch and similar crime prevention programs,civilianization of
 
certain police respohsibilities,and permanent beat assignmentofofficers are all used to
 
maximize the effectiveness ofthe primary community policing initiatives discussed
 
above. Neighborhood Watch extends the eyes and ears ofthe police department by
 
increasing the number ofpeople who report crime or potential problem areas. The key
 
again is citizen involvement which is further facilitated tlurough the permanent
 
assignmentofofficers to a specific beat. With time,the familiarity ofthe officers
 
reassures community residents and increases citizen involvement(Sadd& Grinc,1994).
 
Civilianization ofcertain administrative functions within police departments frees up
 
sworn officers who are then assigned to the community where they can have a more
 
direct impacton community policing efforts. Each ofthese programs hasthe
 
overarching goal ofcitizen involvement based on the premise that only through
 
community Organization and citizen supportcan crime be effectively curtailed. While
 
the evidence to supportthis notion is still somewhatscant,some have reasoned that this
 
may be due to insufficient research(Eck&Rosenbaum,1994),and thatthere seem to be
 
at leastfive solid waysthatcommunity residents can positively effect efforts at crime
 
control. First,citizens can watch and report more actively. Second,they can actively
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patrol and identify problem areas for police officers. Third,they can alter theirown
 
behavior and thereby make the community more crime resistant. Fourth,the united
 
voice ofcitizens can provide the necessary pressure on politicians and others in power
 
in order to affect necessary changes. Fifth,citizens can authorize officers to act in their
 
behalfratherthmi making the task ofthe police officer more difficult by second-

guessing arid criticizing police actions.
 
COP Strategv
 
However varied and expansive the definitions ofcommunity policing may be,
 
Moore(1994)points outthat it is importantto keep a proper perspective on what
 
community policing is and whatit is not. He suggestsit is more than operational
 
programs,reforais iri administration,or situational tactics;rather,commimity policing is
 
allofthe above and then some; in short,it is nothing less than "strategic innovation"(p.
 
290). Community policing then,is better seen as"a collection ofstrategies that share a
 
commonphilosophy orsetofprinciples aboutthedesiredrole ofpolice in society
 
[italics added]"(Rosenbaum&Lurigio,1994,p.302). Thatshared philosophy
 
emphasizes police accovmtability and responsiveness to the communities whichthey
 
serve,a commitmentto helping communities help themselves,and seeing the police-

citizen relationship in a more interactive light(Skogan,1990,as cited in Rosenbaum&
 
Lurigio,1994).
 
While increased citizen involvement is one primary goal ofcommunity policing
 
efforts,and the programsthathave been described are some ofthe most prevalent
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means used to solicit thatinvolvement, none ofthem,individually,constitutes
 
conummity policing. Some have even suggested that existing research demonstrates
 
thatifcommunity policing is implemented as an"isolated change within the police
 
department it will not work"(Sadd& Grinc,1994,p.41). Others have attempted to
 
show how some ofthe more popular tactics which are Often defined as community
 
policing are nothing more dian an attemptto use a differenttool in the contextofa
 
traditional policing strategy(Gordner,1994). Yettrue community policing,at a
 
minimum,is supported by,even designed in concert with,residents ofthe affected
 
communities. Indeed,community policing radically alters the status quo by changing
 
the role ofpolice officer from"crime fighter"to"problem solver"and the relationship
 
between citizens and officers to one of "partnership"(Sadd&Grinc,1994).By casting
 
the police officer in a more generalist role,COPreduces the specialization ofthe police
 
officer that was generated in the reform years and perfected throughoutthe
 
professionalization era. This generalist role goes beyond targeting only those problems
 
that are perceived as directly related to crime control and illuminates other factors that
 
impacta community's quality oflife. The COP philosophy attempts to insertthe police
 
officer into the community and make him or her a part ofthe community in hopesof
 
creating the type ofenvironmentfound in many rural towns:
 
Rural and smalltown police are closer to their commimitythan are urban police.
 
Rural and smalltown police are a partofthe local culture and community,
 
whereas urban police tend to form a subculture and move apartfrom the
 
commimity....Urban police tend to be efficient;rural police tend to be
 
effective.(Weisheit et al., 1994.p.554)
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In this type ofenvironment,the police officers,as well as ail citizens and any
 
other public service agents who interact in the community,are amongthose who make
 
upthe fabric ofthe community. ThusCOP attenipts to create and foster a sense of
 
community thattranscends geographic boundaries. This aspectofcommunity policing
 
has led some to propose thatthe best way to distinguish the real thing from programs
 
merely masquerading as such,isto examine whetherimplementation efforts have raised
 
the level ofcommunity participation and,ultimately,increased citizen satisfaction with
 
police services. (Skolnick&Bayley,1988).
 
COP is also notthe same as Problem Oriented Policing(POP). Capowich&
 
Roehl(1994),point outPOP and COP both came into being at aboutthe sametime and
 
arejust as often seen working together as not. While both COP andPOP involve
 
problem solving(that is,they both shift the locus ofpolice activity from a meansto an
 
ends orientation), COP first and foremostfocuses onthe community and any problems
 
endemic to thatcommunity,whereasPOP identifies problems first and then includes the
 
relevantcommunity in its solution. In this light, it may be argued thatPOP becomes
 
another ofthe many tactical programs that fall under the umbrella ofCOP. Finally,a
 
parade ofscholars and practitioners have enumerated the identifying details of
 
community policing and the distinction between it and other programs which commonly
 
are seen as community policing(Brown,1989;Greene&Decker,1989;Kratcoski&
 
Dukes,1995;Rosenbaum&Lurigio,1994;Sparrow et al., 1990;Trojanowicz&
 
Bucqueroux,1990).
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Distinguishing between strategy and tactics when discussing COP is one ofthe
 
primary problems associated with implementation ofcommunity policing. Morethan
 
merely anew program or tactic for police officers to use in their role ascrime fighters,it
 
involves an almostparadigmatic shift in that role. It encourages proactivity instead of
 
reactivity,problem solving instead of symptom managing,line officer innovation
 
instead ofdogmatic rule following. Whereas tactics merely change the way police
 
respond to crime,strategy seeks to change the entire relationship between police and
 
citizens by making them partners in identifying and solving community problems. The
 
more effectively police officers can be integrated as membersofthe community,the
 
better this new partnership with community residents is expected to function.
 
Butin order to effectively activate this new role in police officers and the
 
citizen-police partnership,there are concomitantchanges which must occur in both the
 
organizational structure and the very culture ofany departmentseeking to implement
 
COP. Before examining these managementimplications,however,a briefreview of
 
several studies will highlightsome ofdie ambiguity surrounding the effectiveness of
 
community policing while atthe same time more clearly substantiating the notion that
 
COP is more thanjusta passing fad—thatit is,a concept with considerable staying
 
power.
 
Effectiveness Review
 
Asthe briefdescription ofcommunity policing above demonstrates,the concept
 
covers a broad realm ofactivities,strategies,and fundamentalchanges in the perception
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ofcrime. Assuch, it is no surprise thatthere has been some degreeofdifficulty in its
 
successful implementation. Regardless,practitioners and researchers alike continue to
 
work at bringing the reality ofcommunity policing a bit closer. Asa result ofthe
 
growing popularity ofcommunity policing,reports ofsuccessful(and failed)
 
implementation efforts from a variety ofperspectives abound. While the attemptto
 
synthesize these efforts is notthe main purpose ofthis paper,there are some valuable
 
lessonsto be learned from even a cursory glance atsome ofthe existing reports.
 
Sadd&Grinc(1994),in areporton community policing efforts across eight
 
cities including,among othersNew York,Houston,and Portland,OR,found widely
 
diverging resultsfrom the various projects with respectto drug trafficking,drug-related
 
crimes,fear ofcrime,community-police relations,and community involvement. While
 
some cities reported marked differences in drug problems and fear ofcrime,others did
 
not,and all cities showed relatively little impactofthe programs on community
 
involvement. The only area ofconsiderable agreement was thatofpolice-community
 
relations, which all cities noted as being at leastsomewhat better. The evaluators
 
attributed the differences to varying levels ofeducation(both on the partofthe police
 
and the community residents)conceming community policing's goals and blamed the
 
lack ofcommxmity involvementas stemming in partfrom the programs all being
 
viewed as"police initiatives"and notinvolving other city agencies(p.50).
 
In Spokane,WA,a special project which wasevaluated imder the rubric of
 
community policing,wasfound to have been generally successful,both in the eyes of
 
officers and community residents,in providing alternative programs and outlooks for
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some ofthe city's mostsocio-economically disadvantaged youths. The findings,
 
however,were very present-oriented and would require long-term follow up to
 
substantiate any lasting benefits(Thurman&Bogen,1993). Seattle,WA,was able to
 
gain voter approval for increased funding and resources to support city-wide
 
implementation ofcommunity policing based on the success oftheir program,a major
 
part ofwhich was attributed to strong community involvementfrom the pointof
 
program inception(National Institute ofJustice, 1992). Onthe other hand,Skogan
 
(1994)cited an implementation effort which resulted in the transfer ofthe district
 
commander and the replacementofthe ChiefofPolice largely because ofover­
zealousness with community policing to the pointofletting basic services slip. A study
 
in Toronto(Murphy,1988)found thatcommunity policing may be overrated and
 
traditional policing overly maligned. It included a suggestion thatcommunity policing
 
may be more effectively viewed as a modification,rather than areplacement,of
 
traditional policing.
 
Other studies have focused onthe personnel aspectofcommunity policing to
 
include factors such asjob satisfaction,skill perceptions,acceptance ofthe commvmity
 
policing philosophy,and perceptions ofcommunity residents,with findings varying
 
considerably both across sites and categories(Greene,1989; Lurigio&Skogan,1994;
 
Rosenbaum et al., 1994; Wilson&Bennet,1994; Wycoff& Skogan,1994; Weisel&
 
Eck,1994). One ofthese studies,in Madison,Wisconsin, produced some interesting
 
results. The implementation ofcommunity policing was approached rather indirectly
 
with the emphasis during the firsttwo years exclusively on incorporating"quality
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policing"(based on EdwardsDemming's managementprinciples), throughoutthe
 
organization(Wycoff&Skogan,1994). The hypothesis presented wasthatcommunity
 
policing,whichinvolves afundamental shift in managementphilosophy,could not be
 
successfully implemented withoutthe quality managementapproach fully ingrained
 
throughoutthe departmentfirst. Interestingly, after the second year,survey findings
 
revealed some positive changesregarding citizens' perceptionsof the police
 
department—all withoutany overtemphasison community policing projects. These
 
findings suggestthat attitudes involved with professional policing,and notjust tactics,
 
may be the biggest problem ofthe traditional approach. The findings also generally
 
supportdie results ofthe Toronto study.
 
Even a briefreview^ such as presented here,is enough to painta kaleidoscopic
 
picture ofthe community policing movement with its myriad approaches and results. It
 
points outthatthe empirical evidence that mightsupportthe viability of community
 
policing is,at best, incdnsistent. Nevertheless,the community policing movement
 
continues to grow. One ofthe reasonsfor this sustained commitmentto community
 
policing may lie in its relationship to contemporary management philosophies. Just as
 
the movetoward police professionalization, with all that it entailed, wasforged in part
 
by the prevailing managementphilosophy ofthe time and solved the most pressing
 
policing issues ofthe day,the movetoward community policing is shaped bythe larger
 
movementtoward quality,or participatory,management. Assuch,it solves one ofthe
 
mosttroublesome issues concerning policing in the days since the President's Crime
 
Commission;namely,thatofpolice-community relations(Eck&Rosenbaum,1994).
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In addition,as Crank(1994)points out,the nature ofconimunity policing allows it to be
 
used by both liberals and conservatives alike to further theirpolar agendas. While
 
conservativesfocus on conimunity policing's order maintenance approach,liberals
 
favor the community organizing aspects ofthe movementthereby affording substantial
 
supportfor COPfrom all comers. Eck&Rosenbaum'S"plastic concept,"commimity
 
policing seemsto have the necessary flexibility to weather assaultsfrom all fronts and
 
still survive(1994,p.3).
 
Buerger(1994)cites three reasons why many continue.Quixotic-like,to strive
 
after community policing. He suggeststhe movementcontinues to be fueled by what
 
Goldstein(1979,1990)dubbed the"meansover endssyndrome"and that police are
 
guilty ofcelebrating the many small successes(means)while ignoring the ultimate
 
impact(ends). Second, Buerger calls attention to the factthatthe movementenjoys the
 
benefit ofalarge depositofpre-packaged solutions and terminology that have
 
accumulated over the years as a result Ofthe many community relations and anti-crime
 
programsofthe pastthat have been lauded for their successes(even those successes
 
were based on short-term results). The final reason for community policing's
 
continuing popularity provided by Buerger is simply the lack ofany feasible alternative
 
solutions. The result is aconceptrobustness which implies thatcommunity policing
 
will be with usfor a considerable time to come in spite ofthe factthata concrete
 
solution,or blueprint for implementation,may yet be well in the future.
 
Implied as well is the warning to forward-looking administrators to prepare to
 
change. Ifevidence indicating favorable trends as a result ofcommunity policing
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efforts continues to mount, there will surely be more and more pressure from citizens'
 
groups,politicians,and eventually peersto geton board and accept the new policies.
 
Additionally,the"plastic" nature of die COP philosophy may well allow it to be used
 
by other public service agencies. The underlying theme ofhelping communitiesto help
 
themselves,coupled with the goal ofbridging the police-community rift,is equally
 
applicable to all services. Acrossthe spectrum ofpublic service agencies,the ideas
 
embodied in the COP philosophy can be effectively used to enhance community
 
relations and thereby improve the quality oflife. From this perspective.Community
 
OrientedPo//cmg'may well be a misnomer; while the orientation is certainly toward
 
community,the applicability reaches far beyond the realm ofpolicing. For
 
practitioners,anticipating these eventualities and preparing now for the future will
 
increase the likelihood ofsuccessfully leading organizations through the changes which
 
lie ahead—especially in light ofthe magnitude ofthe changes required for full
 
implementation ofCOP. These necessary preparations and organizational changes
 
require discussion in orderto illustrate the enormity ofthe challengesfacing
 
contemporary police(as well as other)administrators who are committed to
 
implementing community oriented programs.
 
Kevs to Successful Change
 
As previously mentioned,the reformers whofollowed the classical style of
 
managementin restructuring early American urban police departments were able to
 
solve numerous problems which had besetthose departments. However,as Kelling,
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Wasserman,& Williams(1988)point out,the classical managementapproach did not
 
come without its drawbacks. Specifically,they cite the diverse nature ofthe patrol
 
officer'sjob,which defies detailed proscription and simplification,and the factthat
 
when on patrol officers are rarely imder any direct supervision. The classical approach
 
to management would serve to limit discretion in an arena where discretion is a
 
fundamental necessity for success. This"[discontinuity]between organizational
 
prescriptions and work realities"is seen notonly as creating problemsfor
 
administrators,butfor the officers as well,who are subjected to"considerable role
 
strain"by being"portrayed as professionals on the one hand buttreated as recalcitrant
 
semi-skilled workerson the other"(p.2). Theimpactofthese administrative
 
consistencies has been to create,along with the centralized command and control
 
structure so typical today,a strong line officer subculture in most police departments
 
which relies on informal rules,emphasizes watching outfor other line officers,
 
discouragesformal innovation,and pulls line officers awayfrom both supervisors and
 
the citizens whom they are called to serve into a tightly knit circle ofsolidarity (p.3).
 
The conceptofcommunity policing attempts to rectify the strains created by the
 
classical managementapproach by moving the police organization toward a more
 
participative management style. Scholars and practitioners have stressed the need for
 
several fundamental organizational shifts under this participatory managementstyle,
 
including:(1)a power shift, which hinges on decentralization and the displacementof
 
discretion outto the line officer;(2)atraining shift emphasizing two-way teaching
 
methodologies with afocus on,among other things,problem identification and problem
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solving;and(3)an evaluation shift turning toward innovative thinking and problem
 
solving as the basis for reward and promotion(Roberg,1994;Moore&Stephens,1991,
 
as cited in Wilkinson &Rosenbaum,1994). These three M-eas deserve further
 
discussion to clarify both their interdependent nature as well asthe level ofeffort
 
involved in making the change to COP.
 
Decentralization
 
One ofthe mostcommonly referred to necessities for community policing is the
 
notion ofdecentralization,including its implications for participatory managementand
 
empowermentofline officers. Thefocus ofcommxmity policing(identifying and
 
solving problems atthe community level through greater interaction between officers
 
and citizens)implicitly suggests a need to niove operations outto the community in
 
order to strengthen community ties. For this reason,perhaps,nearly all community
 
policing attempts involve some level ofdecentralization;ata minimum,the majority
 
seem to encompasssometype ofUiini-station system in the effortto bridge the physical
 
and emotional gap between officers and citizens. In a cross-site analysis presented by
 
Weisel&Eck(1994),it wasfound that while none ofthe six programs evaluated
 
involved any"formal decentralization"(in the sense offlattening outthe entire
 
departmental structure),they all emphasized more responsibility and increased decision-

making authority for officers along geographic lines;that is,outto the point where the
 
demonstration projects were being run(p.65). Similarly,an overallimplementation
 
survey conducted in Florida in 1989found that mini-stations and permanent beat
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assignmentfor officers weretwo prominentcomponents which all COP efforts had in
 
common(Greene,1993). Wycoff&Skogan(1994),reporting on one ofthe most
 
successful examplesofcommunity policing implementation to date,cited the actual
 
geographic and functional decentralization ofthe department as being particularly
 
difficult. Bonds between departments and personnel that had beenforged over the years
 
were suddenly disrupted as work centers and responsibilities were shifted. Strained,as
 
well,wasthe mutual trustthat had fomied through fi^ equentface-to-face
 
communication. In spite ofthese challenges,the researchers noted thatthe geographic
 
and functional deCentrali:^tion was generally supported and seen as necessary by
 
departmental personnel.
 
So,while the need for decentralization appearsto be an implicit assumption for
 
those moving toward COP,it does notcome withoutits costs. Complaints abouta
 
"splitforce"and a mid-level management perception ofa loss ofpower associated with
 
decentralization are noted as significant obstacles by some(Pate&Shtull, 1994;
 
Roberg,1994;Wilkinson&Rosenbaum,1994).
 
Training
 
As suggested earlier in this work,ignorance concerning whatconstitutes
 
community policing has engendered confusion surrounding its implementation. This
 
confusion has often become a source of resistance both within police departments as
 
well as within the communities where implementation has been attempted. Where
 
there has not been active resistance,there has been at least apathy,which might be
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interpreted as passive resistance. In either situation,departmentalandcommunity
 
residenttraining is crucial to overcoming the resistance factor(Sadd& Grinc,1994).
 
While police training has been increasingly emphasized during the past century,
 
modem training programsfocus almost exclusively on"adherence to law and discipline
 
and very little on situational problem solving" (Kelling et al., 1988,p.5). In contrast,
 
COP requires a very different set oftools,and thus mustbe approached from a different
 
training perspective. Roberg(1994)stresses the importance ofmoving to a more
 
interactive teaching style, which incorporates both instmctors and students in an
 
exchange ofanalytical reasoning,problem identification,and problem solving. In
 
supportofthis notion, Wilkinson&Rosenbaihn(1994)suggestthat much ofthis
 
trainingis more suited for the field than the classroom. Lee Brown,former Chiefofthe
 
Houston Police Department,emphasized the need to attack training at all levels-—
 
recruiting,cadet,officer,supervisor,and management—with afocuson specific
 
information needs and skills required at each level(Brown,1989). McLaughlin&
 
Donahue(1995)reporton one department's successful training approach,which
 
confronted the training issue in seven phases covering areasfrom COP,POP,and
 
neighborhood organizing,to tactical crirne analysis,crime prevention surveying,and
 
city ordinances. The scope ofthese training areas further highlights the complexity and
 
nature ofthe skills needed for successful COP. In short,there mustbe both substantive
 
and style changesin training at all levels within the department and the affected
 
communities before any meaningfulincrease in knowledge,skills,and results can occur.
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Evaluation and Reward
 
No organization can ever hope to sustain changesin its structure or operational
 
philosophy withoutincorporating supporting mechanisms which reward personnel for
 
worktoward desired goals. Sparrow(1988)points outthatin mosttraditional police
 
departments,officers are required to follow rules,notto exercisejudgmentand
 
discretion. Citing the voluminous departmental regulation manuals which attemptto
 
attemptto address every conceivable situation in which officers mayfind themselves.
 
Sparrow describes tliis regulation-rich environmentas one where"there is little
 
incentive and little time to think,or to have ideas. There is little creativity and very
 
little problem solving. Mostofthe day is taken upjusttrying notto make mistakes"(p.
 
4). Thistype of mentality and reward system runs counterto everything COP hopesto
 
achieve.
 
There is some evidence that departments have been able to successfully
 
implementnew evaluation systems which emphasize officer discretion,innovation,
 
problem solving,and proactivity,and thereby become value- rather than rule-driven
 
(Roberg,1994;Sparrow, 1988; Trojanowicz&Bucqueroux,1990). However,there are
 
some who argue thatthe police cannot disregard such standard measures of
 
effectiveness as response time or arrestrates without bringing imbearable public
 
dissatisfaction and pressure to bear. While there are cases to supportthis contention
 
(Skogan,1994),there is also evidence suggesting thatthe 911 issue and the demands it
 
places on officers may be exaggerated and that it is a wholly manageable problem
 
(Kessler, 1993). Fiarthermore,it is argued that police departments have misled
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themselves into believing that their official measures ofpolice effectiveness are
 
synonymous with citizens' measures ofpolice effectiveness(Eck&Rosenbaum,1994).
 
To the extentthatthe public and police perception ofthe problem differ,the police will
 
continue to be ineffective where it perhaps counts the most—intheeyesofthe citizens
 
whom they serve and upon whom they are dependentfor the majority oftheir support.
 
Therefore,in orderto allow officers to focus oh citizen-perceived problems,asystem of
 
officer performance evaluation rewarding this approach becomes imperative.
 
In conclusion,for COP to be effectively implemented,three componentsof
 
managementstructure mustbe instituted simultaneously. Moving toward
 
decentralization and pushing decision making authority outto the district and line levels
 
cannot work without providing the proper tools(information and training)to those who
 
will now be expected to function in waysto which they are notaccustomed. Similarly,
 
even ifprovided with the necessary tools and authority to use them,unless officers are
 
first liberated from the constraints ofcountless rules,regulations,and a"mistake­
avoidance"mentality,they will be reluctantto exercise their new authority.
 
Eventhough there may general agreement aboutthese necessary changes,there
 
has been little consensus onjusthow to go aboutimplementing them (Wilkinson&
 
Rosenbaum,1994). Police organizations and culture have proven quite resistant to
 
change and continue to befuddle many administrators who have tried to innovate and
 
lead their organizations in new directions(Greene,Bergman,&McLaughlin,1994). In
 
spite ofthe daunting odds,many continue to press ahead and some have met with
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 measured success. Itisfrom the trials and errors ofothers to which weturn for an
 
imderstanding ofwhatstrategies have offered the mostpromise thus far.
 
Implementation Strategies
 
Trojanowicz&Bucqueroux(1990)suggestthatimplementation attempts at
 
community policing mustbe department-wide endeavors in order to insure succes$.
 
They reason that successfulimplementation must be preceded by education and
 
awareness;that withouteverjmne in the departmentijnderstanding how conimunity
 
policing can benefitthem personally,the effortremains vulnerable to failure stemming
 
from internal resistance and lack ofsupport. Ifhistory can serve asa guide,then these
 
claims are wellfoxmded as it has been suggested bysome that internal resistance to
 
decentralization from mid-level managementwasthe primary cause ofthe downfallof
 
the Team Policing efforts ofthe 1970's,often noted asthe precursor to COP(Roberg,
 
1994;Rosenbaum&Lurigio, 1994). As mentioned,others have even expanded the
 
notion ofdepartment-wide implementation by incorporating the community in the
 
education process. Pointing to a citizenry which has been conditioned over many years
 
to perceive the police as the crime fighters,some researchers make the claim that any
 
divergencefrom this stereotypical role tendsto foster confusion and mistrust(Eck&
 
Spellman,1994;Sadd&Grinc, 1994). And while the ideal commimity policing
 
program would involve a complete shift in philosophy,both for the departmentand the
 
community,getting to that point does not happen all at once. In fact,researchers and
 
practitioners alike advocate a piecemeal approach to managing the necessary changes
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(Brown,1989;Roberg,1994;Rosenbaunietal.,1994;Wycoff&iSkogan, 1994).
 
Sparrow(1988)drawsa particularly helpful analogy comparing the typical police
 
departmentto a heavily laden tractor-trailer which caimot be handled like a sportscar
 
when negotiating changes in direction, His point is well summarized in the following
 
statement:
 
Implementing community policing is nota simple policy change thatcan be
 
effected byissuing a directive through normal channels. For the police it is an
 
entirely different wayoflife. The task facing the police chiefis nothing less
 
than to change the fundamental culture ofthe organization,(p.2)
 
Roberg(1994)stresses the import^ce ofa solid foundationfor change before making
 
the move to community policing. He argues thatthe operational philosophy of
 
community policing is such aradical departure from traditional policing that it requires
 
skills and knowledge many police departmentpersoimel are simply lacking. The key,
 
then,is a clear understanding ofdepartmental strengths and limitations followed
 
up by action which willbring the departmentto the point where it will be able to make
 
the change. Rosenbaum et al.(1994),as well, talk about"organizational readiness"
 
and the need for having the necessary structure,policies,procedures,knowledge,and
 
skills in place before making the moveto acommunity policing philosophy. Others
 
seem to agree with these views in positing that it may welltake a generation or longer
 
before a departmentcan really make the switch to community policing (Moore,1994).
 
Choices for Change
 
Underlying all ofthese cautions for change is an implicit assumption that there
 
mustbe aperceived needfor change onthe part ofall involved before they will
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actively support,or at least not resist,the change. In orderto create this perception that
 
change is necessary,many havefollowed atwo-phase approach recommended by
 
Brown(1989). The first phase involves small program changes or demonstration
 
projects which serve the pmpose ofshowing whatis possible,notonly to those within
 
the department,butto those outside as well,thereby making evidentthe possibility of
 
different approaches to the same problems. This phase also indirectly incorporates
 
Sparrow's(1988)recommendations of exposing the defects ofthe current system and
 
bringing outside sources ofpressure to bear on the department. The second phase
 
involves a fuller implemehtation ofthe hew philosophy by expanding the test programs
 
to include the infrastructure ofthe entire department suggesting the need to build a
 
strong foundation first and integrate new programs one step at atime.
 
A review ofthe current literature revealsthat mostattempts to implement
 
community policing have generally followed someroughform ofBrown'stwo-phase
 
approach. In Joliette,Illinois,atwo-year demonstration program first restricted the
 
implementation effort to one specific group or unit,and then expanded to include Other
 
units in the second year. Using the Evanston,Illinois,police department asa control
 
group,a pre-posttest analysis ofthe program showedsome(more the exception than the
 
rule)positive changesin officerjob satisfaction,perceptions ofcommunity policing,
 
and perceptions ofproblem-solving skills. Rather than finding any fault with
 
methodology or theory,the analysts concluded thatthe less than optimal results could
 
be largely attributed to the relative newnessofthe program and the need to yet attain the
 
"critical mass"necessary for sustained institutionalization(Rosenbaum et al., 1994).
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In Seattle,Washington,a siniilar approach wasfollowed and resulted in such
 
great success thatthe citizens subsequently passed an initiative which provided the
 
necessary funding and resources for city-wide implementation. As previously
 
mentioned,at least partofthe greater measure ofsuccess in the Seattle program could
 
be attributed to the very high level ofcommunity involvementin program development.
 
One other lesson from the Seattle experience wasthe identification ofafour-stage
 
process ofrelationship building between citizens and police officers/administrators.
 
The first stage was largely defined by citizen's venting their fhistrations with and
 
challenging the traditional police approaches to the crime problem. The second stage
 
settled into an exchange ofinformation and ideas which facilitated organization,
 
planning,and relationship building. The third stage wascoined the"success"stage in
 
that it consisted ofimplementation ofplanned actions. The successes ofthe third stage
 
seemed to cementthe police citizen relationship as well ascommitmentto the
 
community policing approach. The final stage involved creating mechanisms and
 
otherwiseplanniug forlongtermstability(NationallnstituteofJustice, 1992). While
 
this four stage developmental process involved the citizens and police ofSeattle,this
 
method may also apply to the process ofinternal change within police departments. In
 
particular,the challenging in stage oneseemsto be a necessary step in overcoming the
 
resistance ofpersoimel to any proposed changes.
 
From another perspective,there has been at leastone departmentto date which
 
has successfiilly implemented community policing from the approach suggested by
 
Roberg(1994);that is,laying the organizationalfoimdation before attempting to
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implementcommunity policing in any measure. The Madison,Wisconsin,police
 
department'sfocusonestablishing quality management principles before community
 
policing,as previously mentioned,produced favorable results in the commimity without
 
emphasizing any comrnunity projects, Their plulosophy,captured in the department's
 
motto, "Closer to the People: Quality From the Inside,Out"and the results obtained
 
justthrough creating anew managementculture supportthelogical fit between quality
 
management principles and the philosophy ofconununity policing With its emphasison
 
customer service(Wycoff&Skogan,1994,p.373). Furthermore,while the Madison
 
approach did notresultin a perfectly smooth transition; it was regarded by the
 
evaluators as"one ofthe leasttumultuous[changes]we have witnessed"(p.382). The
 
Madison approach ofdeveloping a new managementstyle first also makessense
 
because departments which choose to implementcommunity policing and are intent
 
on sticking with it will,atsome point,be forced to adoptthe quality management
 
philosophies simply because the goals and processes ofsuccessful community policing
 
demand it.
 
In spite ofthe gargantuan task of successfully changing organizational culture
 
and structure,it seems evidentthat COP is the wave ofthe future. Even those who
 
question its usefulness admitthatthe evidence is not all negative and recognize the
 
successesachieved in certain quarters(Buerger,1994). However,areview ofthe
 
existing literature does notsupportthe notion thatCOP is the panacea which many
 
seem to believe it is while the difficulty encountered by those attempting to implement
 
COP should warn others that it is certainly no quick-fix either. In addition,nothing in
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the literature suggeststhatCOP can(or should)be implemented in every type ofsetting
 
or all departments. Particularly in the military commimity,the question ofCOP's
 
applicability or tenability remains unanswered.
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Chapter4
 
Coimnunily Policing in The Military Epviroiiinent:
 
Square Pegsfor Round Holes?
 
The assumption thatcommunity policing is an equally appropriate solution for
 
all types ofcrime is as naive asthe presumption that it can be(or should be)
 
implemented with equal success in all communities. Particularly in the military
 
community we find a situation where notonly are the crime problemsofa different
 
magnitude,butthe community dynamics are unique as well. In Order to explore the
 
issue of COP's applicability in the military community, it will be helpful to imderstand
 
some ofthe unique characteristics of military policing,its mission,and the environment
 
in which it Operates. We begin with a brief sketch ofmilitary policing's roots.
 
Military Policing:A BriefHistory
 
Dating back to the 11th century,the tradition ofthe military police has been to
 
protectthe government's(or Sovereign's)riches and maintain order among the ranks of
 
the soldiers as suggested by the following charter issued to the Provost Marshall in 1629
 
by King Charles I:
 
The Provost musthave a horse allowed him and some soldiers to attend him
 
and all the restcommanded to obey and assist or else the Service will suffer;
 
for he is but one manand mustcorrect many and therefore he cannotbe beloved.
 
And he mustbe riding from one Garrison to another to see the soldiers do no
 
outrage nor scath the country. (Air Force Regulation[APR]125-3,1977,p. 1-1)
 
Onthe American continent,the first military police unit dates back to the time of
 
the Revolutionary War and was organized along the lines of aregular Continental
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Army company. Although soldiers from time to time were assigned duties normally
 
assumed by military police,and the military wasoften the only recourse pertaining to
 
matters oflaw enforcementfor settlers ofthe western US,the next official formation of
 
a military police unit would notOccur again until the time ofthe Civil War(Wright,
 
1992). Those who served as military police dining the Civil War were granted broad
 
authority in discharging their law enforcementfunctions and could call on any soldier,
 
citizen,constable,sheriff,or police officer to assistthem(APR 125-3,1977).
 
The emerging pattern ofjfprmally organizing military police units during times
 
ofnational or international conflictin order to fulfill a specific need or mission,
 
continued with most units"hastily activated...with ho special supervision or technical
 
training"through the end of WWI(APR 125-3,1977). It was not until WWII thata
 
centrally directed Provost Marshall wasonce again formally established,and not until
 
1948,following the creation ofthe United States Air Porce(as distinguished from the
 
US Army Air Corps which had existed until 1947),thatthe Air Police were formed and
 
professionalization ofthe force began in earnest.
 
Atthe time ofits creation,the mission ofthe Air Police was specified as(1)the
 
protection ofallAir Porce installations,equipment,and militaryinformation;(2)the
 
operation ofall confinementfacilities; and,(3)the enforcementofdiscipline,conduct,
 
and military courtesies(APR 125-3,1977). Pollowing the Korean War,the need for a
 
strong Air Base defense plan wasidentified and the Air Police were charged with the
 
primary responsibility for its developmentand implementation,thus further expanding
 
the role and mission ofthe Air Police. Coupled with the urgency ofprotecting the
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nation's combat-ready weapon systems and nuclear arsenal during the ensuing Cold
 
War years,the Air Police mission wasrechanneled with security for these important
 
resources taking the top priority. In 1960,the title ofAirProvost Marshall was changed
 
to Director of Security and Law Enforcementand in 1966,the Air Police became the
 
Security Police—^both title changes more reflective ofthe redefined mission ofthe
 
force.
 
During the Vietnam Warthe need for a whole-base defense concept was realized
 
and the necessary changes were made to build security plans around installations rather
 
than around weapon systems. In 1971,a division ofresponsibilities occurred when the
 
Security Police career field was separated into two distinct categories—security and
 
law enforcement. This separation offunctions allowed for greater professionalization
 
through specialization and allowed commandersto provide a higher level of traditional
 
law enforcement services as well as security by formally identifying the dual roles and
 
missions ofthe AF Security Police.
 
Todav's Securitv Police Organization
 
The typical Security Police squadrontoday is similar to its civilian police
 
counterpartin both structure and function. Strongly centralized in administration,the
 
chain ofcommand is clear and its use is strongly encouraged and enforced. Standards
 
ofconductas well as regulations governing procedures,authority,and responsibilities
 
are routinely controlled using arigorous system ofrecurring practical evaluations and
 
testing. Communication within squadrons is mostly top-down,although formal
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programsto facilitate bottom-up communication have been part and parcel ofmost
 
organizations for anumber ofyears. Efforts at more bottom-up and lateral
 
communication have greatly increased since implementation ofa Quality Air Force
 
program in the early 1990sthatincludes training for all personnel and formal evaluation
 
for all imits and is based on Total Quality Managementphilosophies tThe Quality
 
Approach.1993). While the mission ofany given SP squadron has been formally
 
divided between security and law enforcement since 1971, the two areas have never
 
been completely divergent because of the symbiotic relationship between security and
 
law enforcementin providing for the overall safety and quality oflife ofall military
 
personnel. Overthe past several years,however,some economiesofscale have been
 
realized through the consolidation of security control centers and law enforcement
 
control centers into one security police control center with dispatchers certified in both
 
security and law enforcementfunctions and the dual certification ofsecurity specialists
 
who now regularly augmenttheir law enforcement cormterparts. The primary
 
differences between the typical SP squadron and its civilian counterpeut can be found in
 
this multi-faceted mission or role ofthe SP unit. While the civiliem departmentfocuses
 
largely onlaw enforcement,SP units are responsible for security and Air Base Defense
 
with traditional law enforcement being one subcomponentofthis greater goal.
 
The Military Community
 
Similar to the traditional police model,the SP philosophy heis embraced the
 
notion ofthe police as crime fighters,but perhaps notto the extentofcivilian
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departments because offour unique characteristics ofthe environment within which the
 
SP units operate. First,the typical Air Force installationis a closed environment
 
inhabited bya large contingentof "citizens"who are also military personnel specially
 
trained to operate in stressful and unusual contingency situations,often in direct support
 
oflaw enforcementand security operations. Assuch,the SP have notonly the
 
authority to order other military persoiinel to assistthem under certain conditions,they
 
also use this authority on aregular basis. Even during normal operations,security
 
awareness exercises and otherlaw enforcementrelated scenarios,such as anti-robbery
 
exercises,are carried out with all participating players—whetherajetengine technician
 
ora bank teller—evaluated on their responses.
 
Second,the closed environmentofthe military community also allowsfor
 
tighter control over who is allowed access to the commimity. Consequently,both the
 
volume and assortmentofcrimes committed are reduced by precluding those with a
 
higher propensity toward criminal conductfrom transiting the installation. This"border
 
control" mechanism actually worksin both directions; that is,in addition to preventing
 
unauthorized individualsfrom entering the installation, military commanders also have
 
the authority to expeltroublemakers or personnel who are found guilty ofany number
 
ofcrimes or other violations. While civilian communities exercise aform of"border
 
control"as wellthrough incarceration ofserious offenders,the military community
 
regularly prevents individualsfrom transiting the base confinesfor much less serious
 
offenses. Thus,by intervening earlier,the military community is somewhatshielded
 
from more serious criminal activity than neighboring civilian communities. In the case
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ofmilitary personnel,the offender may simply be discharged and his/her privileges to
 
access the base revoked. In a situation where dependents ofmilitary personnel residing
 
in base housing arefound to bethe source of problems, the family may lose their right
 
to governmenthousing and be asked to find domicile outside the installation confines.
 
And while the family may be allowed to enter the base asthey desire, the individual
 
dependent(s)identified as the problem source(s)may have their base access privileges
 
permanently revoked,thereby ensuring alow rate ofon-base recidivism.
 
Taken together,this ability to control access to military commimities
 
significantly reduces installation crime rates whencompared to neighboring civilian
 
communities(Table One provides illustrative data comparing March AFB with
 
neighboring Riverside,CA). The considerably lower crime rates consequently diminish
 
the need for extraordinary crime fighting measures and greatly increases the flexibility
 
ofthe SP squadronsto initiate crime prevention or other non-traditional law
 
enforcement programs.
 
1992PartOneIndex CrimesPer100,000Population
 
Location murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Larceny GTA
 
Riverside,CA 10 55 497 925 1872 3703 1491
 
MarchAFB,CA 0 0 0 202 18 1903 64
 
TableOne
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A third unique characteristic ofthe military community is the difference
 
between the young adult population when compared to its civilian counterpart.
 
Specifically,the group is made upofindividuals who have voluntarily chosen tojoin
 
the military and therefore have a personal interest in making the bestoftheir
 
opportunities. For many young officers and enlisted personnel,the military is a chosen
 
career;for others,it is a stepping stone. In both situations,however,there exists
 
considerable motivation to make the bestofthe presentcircumstances in order to further
 
one's career,whether that be in the military or not. In addition, the military young
 
adult is more limited in his/her individual freedoms. While the military does not
 
completely control an individual's life,it does exert substantial influence over both on-

duty as well as off-duty conductthrough the attachmentofvery clear consequencesto
 
conformity or nonconformity with military values and culture. The strong military
 
culture,supervisorinvolvementin one's life,and the personal investment individuals
 
have in their careers provide powerful encouragementfor adherence to the principles
 
and values espoused by the military community. The encouragementor motivation to
 
conform with community normsserves as a strong informal control that diminishes the
 
need forformal control mechanisms such asthe police. The stronger these informal
 
controls,the less the need forformal policing.
 
Thefourth peculiarity ofthe normal AF installation isfound in a structure where
 
all public service agencies(police,fire, civil engineering,community services)are
 
grouped to function in concert under one commander(Support Group Commander)and
 
worktoward ajoint goal ofimproving the quality oflife for all base residents and
 
personnel. Even outside ofthe Support Group,the installation as a whole emphasizes a
 
team effort in all undertakings recognizing the factthat everyone On the installation
 
plays an importantrole in overall mission accomplishment. Thisteamwork approach
 
serves as a shield againstthe parochialism that is endemic in mosthighly specialized,
 
professional organizations. Thus,the COP goal of casting the police officer as
 
problem solver and facilitator is superseded in the Air Force environment by investing
 
an individual ofhigher rank with the necessary authority and express responsibility of
 
community problem solver. While in the civilian community this responsibility
 
typically rests with the Mayor,the ability to influence other agencies to work together in
 
order to achieve acommon goal is strongerfor the military commander because ofa
 
more direct and clearly defined chain ofcommand. Notonly are there significant
 
economies ofscale achieved through grouping under one individual all ofthose
 
agencies responsible for the military community citizens' quality oflife,the powerthis
 
individual wields overthose under his/her command facilitates a level ofteamwork that
 
few cities have been able to achieve in their efforts at community policing.
 
While some may be wary ofvesting one individual with such a high level of
 
power and authority, the overarching mission ofeach installation, which is not directly
 
tied to any one service group or agency, serves as an effective check and balance on the
 
authority and power ofthe Support Group Commander. In reality,the more the Support
 
Group Commandercan facilitate agency interaction and teamworktoward improving
 
the quality oflife,the closer thatcommandercomesto realizing the COP goal of
 
increasing community problem solving skills within all public service agencies.
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Implementing COP:Weak Tncentives
 
While onthe one hand it would seem thatthe unique environmentand functional
 
structure ofthe typical AF installation provide for acommunity highly amenable to
 
Commimity Oriented Policing,it is nevertheless unlikely thatCOP as it is defined in the
 
current literature will successfully replace traditional policing asa newphilosophy
 
primarily because whatCOP hopesto achieve with respectto commimity organizing
 
and crime prevention,the AFcommunity has already realized. To alarge extent,as
 
pointed outby Skogan(Buerger,1994),COP assumesa broken down community; a
 
community that has become disorganized following the disintegration oftraditional
 
informal social controls. Tothe extentthat this breakdown has not occurred in AF
 
communities,those communities already resemble the idealCOPcommunity and as a
 
result ofthis,there is no pressing need for significant changesto occur with regard to
 
COP.
 
In Search ofa Need
 
Asother civilian departments have come to realize,before being able to alter the
 
culture ofa highly centralized bureaucratic organization such as a police department
 
there mustfirst exist a strongly perceived need for change. In the military environment
 
depicted here,the mission and role ofthe SP is not derived solely from theimage ofthe
 
crime fighter,butratherfrom the overall mission ofthe Air Force and each individual
 
installation. Therefore,the need for change would mostlikely have to be driven by
 
events or circumstances that provethemselves detrimentalto mission accomplishment.
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While severe crime problems certainly could have a negative impacton the
 
overall mission by having a detrimental effecton the quality oflife ofthose who reside
 
and work atthe military installation, the unique characteristics ofthe military
 
conummity combine to produce relatively benign crime rates. One may argue that
 
crime problems could grow to the pointthat changes would be demanded;however,this
 
scenario is imlikely in light ofthe niilitary community's strong informalsocial control
 
mechanismsthat effectively reduce the levels ofcrime on AF installations. With a
 
strong discipline ethic,a philosophy thatencourages—even requires—-supervisorsto
 
become very involved in subordinates'personal lives and problems,the"border
 
control"capability ofAir Force installations,and the ability ofcommandersto punish
 
and/or even expel serious offenders from the installation,the need forformal police
 
action is significantly reduced. The combination ofthese factors creates a community
 
that is not only well suited for COP,butin reality is already exercising the COP
 
philosophy. Asone scholar pointed out,"Anticrime organizations are often most
 
successful in commimities that need them least...[and]leastcommon where they
 
appear to be most needed—in low-income,heterogeneous,deteriorated,renting,high­
tumOver,high-crime areas"(Skogan 1988,p.42,45). Air Force communities are no
 
exception to this observation.
 
Implementing Tactical Change in The SP Unit
 
Although there are many existing similarities in structure and methodology
 
between civilian and military police units,this does not necessarily mean thatthere are
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parallels in managing change in both types ofdepartments. Someofthe more salient
 
issues and problems with which many civilian police agencies are currently grappling
 
do notequally apply to Air Force SP units wishing to engage in COP programs. Of
 
particular significance are the issues ofdecentralization,training,and evaluation and
 
their applicability to the SP imit.
 
The geography oftypical Air Force installations diminishes the need for
 
physical decentralization ofthe police department. The relatively small size ofmost
 
bases enables easy access to the police for base residents and employees. Air Force
 
communities also offer citizens direct access to the highestlevels ofleadership through
 
a variety ofmechanisms,the mostcommon being a Commander's HotLine which
 
allows people to lodge any variety ofcomplaints or simply ask questions. Accessibility
 
is also increased by virtue ofthe fact that Chiefs ofPolice,as well as many police
 
officers,routinely live within the base community. This phenomenon,rare in urban
 
police departments,opens up the police rank and file to the informal accountability
 
(accountability to the community)that is cited as an importantingredientin police-

community relations in rural communities by Weisheit,Wells,and Falcone(1994). In
 
addition,this informal accoimtability serves to curb line officer discretion somewhat as
 
police officers are held not only accountable to their supervisors,butto the community
 
residents with whom they live and work daily. The resulting environmentclosely
 
resemblesa small,ruraltown where citizens play a larger role in community affairs and
 
differs markedly from the sprawling,urban city with its imposing levels ofbureaucracy
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thatsomewhatshield police officers from direct public access and scrutiny. Asnoted
 
by Eisenstein(Weisheit et al. 1994,p.553):
 
A major explanation for the high degree ofpolice discretion found in urban
 
areas is the low visibility ofpolice actions. In smaller communitiesthe
 
actions ofpolice officers are known to mostofthe population thanksto the
 
effectiveness^d extensiveness ofinformal communication networks;
 
there they are more highly visible. Asa result,smalltown police enjoy less
 
latitude in deviating from dominantcommunity values,
 
While the nature ofthe AF Community lessens the need for physical
 
decentralization ofthe SP unit, functional decentralization is also less likely to ocCur
 
unless it is fully supported by the highestlevels ofinstallation leadership. The military
 
culture places high levels of responsibility and accountability on its senior officers and
 
senior non-commissioned officers. Mistakes made byjunior enlisted personnel,or
 
junior officers,are routinely answered for by supervisors. This situation creates an
 
environment where individual discretion is sharply curtailed atthe patrol officer level so
 
thatcommandersand mid-level managers are able to maintain stricter control over line
 
officer behavior. While this scenario is similar to thatfound in mostcivilian police
 
departments,it is perhaps more acutely felt in the military environment because ofthe
 
direct chain between police commanders and senior base leadership. Leadership lapses
 
onthe part ofthose vested with coinmand authority are nottolerated well and can
 
quickly lead to career ending performance evaluations.
 
Unlike decentralization,training and evaluation issues relevantto the civilian
 
police department apply to the SP squadron as well. Air Force training occurs on at
 
leasttwo levels begirming with initial Air Force-level training at Technical Training
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schoolsfollowing completion of the initial Air Force Basic Training. While this
 
training covers the basics ofpolice work, it does notinclude the various skills or
 
methods dictated by the variety ofmissionsfound across Air Force installations. New
 
recruits,then,must undergo further training oncethey arrive attheir newly assigned
 
destinations in order to be successfully integrated into their respective units. Moreover,
 
because ofthe fluid nature ofmilitary life, which results in reassignmentto other
 
installations every few yearsfor most personnel,continued training—evenfor seasoned
 
police officers—isa constant necessity. This multi-tiered and continuing training
 
becomesa concern in that inconsistencies between training levels or locations could
 
breed confusion and/or cynicism onthe part ofpolice officers and make
 
implementation ofany desired changes more difficult. Thus,Air Force level
 
coordination oftraining in both operating philosophies and tactics becomesimportant
 
regardless ofthe chosen direction.
 
Equitable implementation ofevaluation systems,as well,is benefited by Air
 
Force level control. Because SP officers and enlisted personnel compete against all
 
other Air Force SP officers and enlisted personnel for promotion and career
 
advancement opportunities,similar criteria mustbe rewarded equally across the board.
 
Unless implementation ofCOP tactics is approached from an Air Force level,the
 
reward system necessary to motivate SP personnelto change to anew operating
 
philosophy will not exist. Withoutthe necessary reward-based motivation,successful
 
implementation ofany program(s)becomes an insurmountable task. Finally, efforts at
 
revising existing training and evaluation systemsshould be attacked simultaneously and
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in a complementary fashion.Implementation ofa new evaluation and reward system
 
cannot be effective withoutthe necessary training to supportthe desired roles and
 
behaviors. Conversely,even with proper training,an evaluation and reward system that
 
is not reflective ofnewly desired behaviors/actions will not provide the necessary
 
motivation for people to implementthe desired changes or use the training they have
 
been given.
 
In short,although the typical SP organization resembles the traditional police
 
department,both in structure and culture,it also operates in a significantly different
 
environmentthat strongly curtails the need for any radical changes in departmental
 
culture or operating philosophy. The unique characteristics ofthe Air Force installation
 
provide for a sense ofcommunity rarely found outside ofrural America. Geographic
 
boimdaries,which are controlled effectively by the Security Police,coupled with a
 
population which is made more homogenous by thecommonality ofthe military culture
 
and installation mission,create an environmentin stark contrastto the inner city,
 
ghettoized neighborhoods described by Wilson&Kelling(1982);neighborhoods that
 
have been blamed for manyofthe more severe crime problemsfaced by contemporary
 
urban police departments. Absentany pressing social or political need for change,the
 
probability thattrue reform atthe strategic level could be(or need be)successfully
 
achieved within the average SP unit is remote. However,just because there may be no
 
pressing crime-related or social issues across AF communities which would drive a
 
massive reform efforttoward Community Oriented Policing,there is a need for
 
continued community oriented actions or activities that will preserve the strong sense of
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community that does exist. In fact, the Air Force Security Police already performs
 
manyfunctions which arguably fall underthe rubric ofCommunity Oriented Policing
 
and may fill some ofthis need for continuedcommunity oriented activities.
 
Additionally, recent Air Force-level changesin management philosophies bode wellfor
 
continued developmentofsome ofthe more importantcomponentsofthe COP
 
philosophy.
 
Air Force Community Oriented Policing
 
Meagher(1985)found thatcommunity size impactsthe type ofservice provided
 
by police departments. Following acontinuum ofsorts,smallertown police
 
departments werefound to focus more on crime prevention while larger departments
 
emphasized law enforcementand arrest rates. Flanagan(1985)cited similar results in
 
another study showing that whereas large cities tended to expect police to concentrate
 
on being crime fighters,smalltowns expected a wider variety ofservices and functions
 
from their police departments. In light ofthe evidence thatAFcommunities most
 
closely parallel rural towns,it is not surprising to find thatAFSP units have
 
traditionally provided a range ofservices which are responsive to the desires and needs
 
ofthe communitiesthey serve. A briefexploratory survey ofnine AFSP units
 
produced sometelling results with regard to COPin the Air Force. The survey was
 
conducted telephonically with the seniorLaw EnforcementNon-Commissioned Officer
 
(or mostknowledgeable NCO with regard to COP)ateach ofthe nine selected units.
 
Ofthe nine units,two were pending base closure within the following nine months,a
 
fact which somewhatlimited their ability to perform any more than the absolute
 
minimum law enforcementsupport. Two other units were facing significant—albeit
 
temporary—personnel shortages which also affected their capability to perform other
 
than essential services; yeteach ofthese imits was planning to resumeCOP programs
 
and/or otherwise expand existing efforts. Thefollowing discussion does not presume to
 
cover all programs or efforts which may be ongoing atthe selected installations. It does
 
however provide an overview ofthe kinds ofprograms which are typical at mostAF
 
installations as well assome insight into the current perception ofwhatactually
 
constitutes COP.
 
Findings
 
Withoutfirst differentiating between COP asaphilosophy or asatactical
 
program,six ofthe nine units queried indicated they had formally adopted Commxmity
 
Oriented Policing. The three units which had notdone so cited personnel shortfalls as
 
the primary reason for not making more ofan effort to implementCOP. When
 
questioned whatcomponent(s)they had implemented,bike patrol wasthe answer 100
 
percentofthe time suggesting thatthere existed a perception in the minds ofthose
 
questioned that bike patrolling wastantamountto Community Oriented Policing. When
 
pressed for other programs which mightbe considered as COP,the respondents listed
 
several,all ofwhich are discussed below.
 
In the realm offormal programs,AFSP units have aggressively pursued
 
activities in resource protection and crime prevention for many years. Resource
 
Protection is aformally evaluated program covering the"business"or operational side
 
ofan AF installation. Typical activities incltide insuring cornpliance with AF directives
 
governing funds and other non-priority resources(such as weapons)through training of
 
personnel who have been delegated responsibility over these resources and periodic
 
inspection oftheir facilities and agency programs.
 
Crime Prevention programs(also formally evaluated),on the other hand,are
 
directed moretoward the base residents although they also encompasselements ofthe
 
base business community. Typical duties for those assigned to Crime Prevention office
 
include the publishing oftimely newspaper articles identifying currentcrime trends and
 
suggesting ways individuals can protectthemselves against becoming victims;training
 
the various unit managersin proper crime prevention techniques for their respective
 
units;conducting home crime prevention surveys in an effortto identify vulnerabilities
 
and help citizens recognize waysin which they can better"crime-proof their
 
residences; organizing and monitoring Neighborhood Watch programs;administering
 
the installation D.A.R.E program; briefing all newly assigned personnelin local crime
 
problems and crime prevention techniques;and managing the installation Product
 
Identification program that allows individuals to have valuable belongings engraved and
 
registered in case oftheft. The individuals selected as Crime Prevention officers also
 
have the opportunity to undergoformal training.
 
Many proponents ofCOP have stressed that department-wide implementation is
 
necessary to insure a successful shift in departmental culture. While the Resource
 
Protection and Crime Prevention programsdo notinvolve all SP personnel in the unit.
 
they are nevertheless indicative ofa philosophy ofcatering to the needs ofthe
 
community—whetherthat be the business or residential community. In addition,they
 
certainly involve services and activities that are notconsidered as normallaw
 
enforcement and surely do notfitthe stereotypical "Joe Friday"image ofcrime fighter.
 
All ofthe nine surveyed bases had active Crime Prevention and Resource Protection
 
programs. Furthermore,because the programs are formally evaluated(Air Force wide),
 
it can be safely assumed that all AFSPimits have similar programs.
 
Other non-traditional police activities in which all nine bases engaged included
 
after-hours building checks(rattling door knobs;checking windows), stray animal
 
control,bike patrols,and foot patrols. Building checks and stray animal control are
 
activities,like Crime Prevention and Resource Protection,that began independently of
 
the currentCOP fervor and have been pursued overthe years because they continue to
 
serve a useful purpose in the community. Bike patrols are an attemptto movethe
 
police officer in certain areas to a bicycle,thereby increasing community accessibility to
 
the police officer. A variation ofthe foot beatofan earlier era, bike patrols offer greater
 
mobility for the police officer while maintaining the ability to build the rapport with
 
citizens that disappeared with the adventofthe patrol vehicle and rapid response goals.
 
While once attempted atsome AF installations in years past,bike patrols have become
 
enormously popular and owe their resurrection to the COP movement. Initiated at
 
Major Command level,bike patrols are now 100 percent supported in at leasttwo ofthe
 
Air Force's eight Major Commands. Survey respondents indicated thatfeedback from
 
both police officers and supervisors as well ascommunity residents,installation
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leadership,and other installation personnel has been virtually unanimous in its support
 
ofthe bike patrol program. Thefew negative comments concerning the program came
 
from line supervisors who complained under conditions ofmeagerstaffing that it was
 
difficult to post bike patrols in addition to other required patrols,or that bike patrols
 
"robbed"them oftheir ability to perform"real"police work—acommentnot
 
uncommon in civilian departments which have tried to implementcomponentsofCOP.
 
Six ofthe nine installations surveyed indicated their bike patrol officers received formal
 
training from local civilian police agencies that provided the service for their own
 
officers as well. Ofthe three units that did not currently have aformaltraining
 
program,two cited personnel shortfalls and one was closing within the nexttwo
 
months; the two with personnel shortfalls indicated they had a plan to beginformal
 
training when they could afford to do so. All six ofthe nine units surveyed that
 
indicated they had bike patrols indicated that bike patrol officers were permanently
 
assigned to specified beats,whilefour ofthose six units attested to having a dedicated
 
bike patrol section whose members worked as a separate unitfrom the remainder ofthe
 
force. While this type ofstructural arrangement has proven problematic for some
 
civilian police departments,none ofthose surveyed cited any problemsstemmingfrom
 
the splitting ofthe force. In fact,all units noted an overage ofvolunteers to work bike
 
patrol duties indicating that line officers had afavorable impression ofthat particular
 
program.
 
Foot patrols at all nine installations were used mostly to apply more police
 
presence in areas identified through crime analysis as problem zones.Several indicated
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foot patrols were used to augmentbike patrols on arandom basis and thatfoot patrols
 
would increase in quantity over bike patrols during the winter months because of
 
inclement weather.As with bike patrols,all respondents mentioned similarly positive
 
feedback concerning foot patrols while those who noted some dissatisfaction cited the
 
same reasons line supervisors gave concerning bike patrols.
 
Discussion
 
The findings ofthis briefexploratory survey highlightsome interesting points.
 
First,it seemsthat personnel viewed bike patrols and COP assynonymous. When
 
asked iftheir unit had formally adopted COP,those responding affirmatively cited bike
 
patrols asthe program related to COP. Even those units that did notclaim anyformal
 
adoption ofCOP noted they were conducting bike patrols. Next,the virtual
 
institutionalization ofCrime Prevention and Resource Protection programs supports the
 
notion thatthose programs that are evaluated and rewardedfrom higher Headquarters
 
are those which receive attention atthe unit level. This would also explain the
 
popularity ofthe bike patrol program which has been similarly initiated atthe Major
 
Command level. Finally,simileir resistance can be expected from some within the SP
 
organization to changes ofany kind. The comments about"real" police work are
 
indicative ofofficers holding a professional policing philosophy. Although there are
 
programs conducted that wouldjustifiably be termed asCOP programs,the
 
philosophies of professional policing may still be well-ingrained in the minds ofmany
 
SP persormel and this factor should be considered whenformulating plans for further
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integration ofCOP programs. Onthe other hand, all nine iinits said they had no lack of
 
volunteers for their bike patrol program. This popularity mightindicate a willingness
 
on the partofthe line officer(who are traditionally among the yomigestin an AF SP
 
unit as opposed to the line supervisors who are more seasoned)to try different methods
 
ofpolicing. The program's popularity may also,however,be due to the novelty ofthe
 
program,which would mean thatin die long run its popularity would likely decline.
 
In summary,while AF installations do not exhibitthe same driving needs that
 
have spawned the growth ofCOPinthe civilian world,they nonetheless remain afertile
 
environmentfor COP tactics. The similarities between ruraltownsand AF
 
communities mean that many police activities that do notfall under the contemporary
 
COP vocabulary are nevertheless actively pursued because they provide services desired
 
by the community and, in some cases,are demanded by higher authority. In this sense,
 
much like the rural towns which have performed COPfor years—although they may
 
have not been recognized as doing so(Weisheit et al., 1994)—^AF SP units have
 
performed componentsofCOPfor many years as well. Assuch,full implementation
 
ofCOP as anew operating philosophy may not be necessary in AF communities
 
because ofthe different nature ofthe community,the unique demandsofthe SP
 
mission,and the services which are already provided. In reality,COP inthe military
 
community is notacase offitting square pegs into round holes—the proper fit has
 
already existed for some time.
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 Chapter Five
 
Discussion and Recommendations
 
Summary
 
Tracing the history ofurban policing,we find that changes in law enforcement
 
were preceded by events or changesin society that first created an atmosphere
 
conducive to change. The migration offarm laborers to the urban areas of 19th
 
Century England and the subsequent concentration ofcrime and disorder in those areas
 
triggered a growing sense ofvmeasiness among those with power to initiate changes.
 
Absentthat sensation ofgrowing disorder,one could argue that Peel's Bobbies may
 
^ ■ „ ■ .. .. ■ . , 
have yet been well into the future. Similarly,void ofthe rampantcorruption oflocal
 
politicians in early urban America and the havocthey created among America's first
 
urban police departments,onecan legitimately argue thatthe professionalization of
 
policing may nothave matured quite as soon as it did. Even once initiated,the
 
professionalization ofpolice work did notfollow a steady,straight-line evolution either;
 
rather,it wasjolted and pushed along an unpredictable and ever-changing course.
 
Improved technology,tenacious leadership by afew key individuals,evolving
 
management principles in the business world,and the omnipresentneed for law
 
enforcementin urban areas keptthe movementprogressing.
 
In a like manner.Community Oriented Policing found its genesis in issues
 
relevantto society at large in the 1960s. The Civil Rights movement,urban umest,
 
overly aggressive police tactics,and the distancing ofpolice officersfrom the public
 
they served combined to create a new impetusfor change,slowly nudging awayfrom
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the professional model ofpolicing. Similar to the road followed by the professional
 
model ofpolicing,GOP encountered its share ofstops and starts,sputters and surges.
 
Empirical research demonstrated some ofthe things that were wrong with the
 
professional model and its fundamental assumptions,new managementtechniques
 
offered options to the status quo ofpolice administration,and the changing face of
 
inner-city America provided the necessary set ofproblems which keptthe questfor
 
altemative responses to the crime problem alive.
 
Underlying the changes which have occurred over the past250 years ofthe
 
history ofpolicing is the factor ofneed. Largely creatures ofhabit,people are generally
 
loathe to make changes unless the first perceive that change is necessary and/or
 
desirable. Once the need for change makes itselfmanifest(even when that
 
manifestation may be an illusion) Americans have a demonstrated propensity for
 
reform. Consequently,when deliberating the changeto COP,one must also give the
 
potency ofthe desire for change its due consideration in orderto successfully predict an
 
outcome. Especially in attempting to change something as ingrained as organizational
 
or institutional culture,the impetus driving the change cannot befound impotent ifit is
 
expected to generate enough momentum to overcome the considerable inertia it faces.
 
Successful change mustbe dealt with systematically; all aspects ofform and function
 
must be carefully thoughtthrough lest the momentum fractures itselfon unanticipated
 
obstacles. Whilethejury is still out with respectto the future ofCOP in America's
 
urban police departments,there have been some significant strides made in directing
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change and achieving results and preliminary findings suggestthatCOP has afighting
 
chance ofsuccessfiilly altering the status quo.
 
Whether or notthese same reforms can(or should)be successfiilly applied to the
 
Air Force Security Police is an entirely different question and requires examination of
 
the same,as well assome other,significant factors. Primarily,the question ofneed for
 
change is up for debate. Air Force communities,with the ability to control access
 
through effective border control mechanisms,the high degree ofinvestment which its
 
members have in maintaining community norms and upholding AF values,the
 
homogeneity ofcommunity,the smalltown atmosphere, and some ofthe other
 
similarities it shares with rural America resultin significantly lower crime rates than
 
thosefound in America's urban areas. Consequently,the AFcommunity environment
 
is at once ideal for COP programs and largely devoid ofthe need for COP asanew
 
philosophy. Certain aspects of the COP philosophy,however,should be applicable in
 
any community;even in the AF commimity which already embodies many
 
characteristics thatthe COP philosophy attempts to create,further enhancements are
 
nearly always desirable. Specifically, since successfullaw enforcement has been
 
dependenton public support since the days before urban policing, aspects of
 
community policing designed to bring police officers and citizens closer together can
 
only improve a police department's ability to maintain order and solve crimes. Evenin
 
commxmities where that police officer-citizen gap is not as great(or even nonexistent),
 
closer relations between police and citizens can only enhance crime control efforts and
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improve customer satisfaction,which in turn should raise the level ofsupport given the
 
police department.
 
While SP units have made great progress overthe years in providing non­
traditional law enforcement services,existing programs sometimes suffer by being
 
categorized as not being "real"police work. The police work orientation could be
 
enhanced by making clear to line officers and supervisors the significance ofproviding
 
these kinds ofservices. Recentattemptsto integrate COPthrough the initiation of
 
bike patrols,as well,will take on more meaning asthose implementing and managing
 
the changescometo understand the worth and positive side effects ofcommunity
 
oriented programs. For it is notthe fact that police officers movefrom the confines of
 
their patrol cars to thefreedom ofthe sidewalks that gives worth and value to bike or
 
foot patrols,rather it is the underlying message that interaction between police and
 
community residents is desirable ifit raises the quality ofcommunity life. In reality,
 
with COPthere is more at stake than higher arrest rates and lower crime rates; quality of
 
life is the relevantissue,whether that be addressed through order maintenance,
 
increased citizen involvementin crime control,greater involvementby all public service
 
agenciesfunctioning in the community,enhanced police-community relations,or higher
 
arrest and lower crime rates.
 
The strides made in the Air Force in recent yearstoward Total Quality
 
Managementdovetail well into the COP philosophy and quality oflife issues. The
 
principles learned through TQM training will automatically amplify the effort police
 
officers make in reaching outto their communities;and this withoutany specific focus
 
71
 
on COP,as evidenced by the success enjoyed in the Madison,Wisconsin police
 
department(Wycoff&Skogan,1994). So,while the need for a change to COP may
 
notbe as evidentin AF communities as in manyofthe urban areas ofAmerica,the
 
desirability of a greater emphasison certain aspects ofthe COP philosophy still exists.
 
In order for SP unitsto successfully enhance their currentlaw enforcement services,
 
there are several areas ofconcern which warrant continued research and evaluation.
 
Recommendations
 
There seemsto be an assumption onthe partofmany SP officers and enlisted
 
personnel that because SP units are similar in structure to urban police departments,that
 
they mustalso function like their civilian counterparts. While the professionalization of
 
police work generated by the early reforms has also benefited Air Force police efforts,a
 
clear understanding ofthe dissimilarities between SP units and the typical urban
 
departmentis also important. Through careful analysis ofthe dissimilarities between
 
the two types ofagencies.Commanders will then be better able to identify areas that
 
could(or should)not be realistically integrated or changed. Similarly,the study of
 
rural police departments and the various services provided bythem is one area which
 
could strengthen the Air Force's ability to tailor future law enforcementtraining and
 
plan for any desired changes. Particularly,the notion ofmore citizen
 
inVolvement/control oversome aspects ofpolice work as isfoimd in many rural
 
departments should be further investigated in order to identify desirable ways of
 
enhancing the police-community partnership. The idea ofbringing community
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residents and police officers closer together and reorienting the crime fighting focus
 
toward problem solving in unison with community residents and other public service
 
organizations will tend to enhance any police tactics or strategies implemented. In the
 
end,understanding the nature ofthe AF SP unit,its mission,the contributions it already
 
makes,the unique characteristics ofthe AF community,and whatactivities are needed
 
in orderto perpetuate the sense ofcommunity thus far experienced will help define the
 
appropriate course to follow.
 
Continued research ofthe COP philosophy and monitoring ofongoing
 
advancements will also aid those charged with developing training and other programs
 
atthe Major Command or Air Force level in order to identify and maximize
 
implementation of those componentsofCOP which would be most beneficial to the AF
 
community. Specifically,integrating COP withTQM principles would create the ideal
 
platform for continued education and training of SP persoimel. In a like manner,
 
careful evaluation ofongoing COP programs in the civilian community and close
 
working relationships with civilian departments will enable AFSP units to avoid
 
reinventing the wheel,especially in those situations wherethe wheel proves to be
 
defective. Additionally,critical evaluation ofnewly introduced programs,such as bike
 
patrols,is needed in orderto establish the usefulness ofthese programs and thereby
 
clearly illustratejust whythese new programs are being pursued. Both the SP units and
 
their civilian counterparts,particularly those in rural areas,may benefitfromjoint
 
training and education and may achieve some economiesofscale through mutual
 
interaction as well.
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Just as COP is notequally applicable to all civilian communities,it may not be
 
equivalently useful at all AF installations or even in all areas ofany given installation.
 
Especially in environments with a highly transient population,such astraining bases
 
where some ofthe unique characteristics ofthe traditional AF commxmity do not exist,
 
there will be areas ofthe installation where COP programs may notbe as useful.
 
Further research into whatfactors make an environment particularly well suited to COP
 
will help avoid wasting scarce resources and maximizing use ofthose resources where
 
they are needed the most.
 
In conclusion,better understanding the dynamics which have shaped and
 
continue to shape the role ofpolice in society will enable usto adaptthose changes most
 
desirable while avoiding those which ultimately serve no useful purpose. Notonly will
 
customer satisfaction rise(along with the attendantincreases in supportfor the police),
 
butjob satisfaction should grow as well as officers better understand the purposes
 
behind the actions and changesthey are asked to make. Similarly,a clear recognition of
 
the uniqueness ofthe AFcommunity and an understanding that police work isjustone
 
small slice ofthe pie which determines acommunity's quality oflife will overcome
 
resistance to changes which move awayfrom the traditional modelofpolicing.
 
Ignoring these realities,on the other hand, and nottaking time to carefully analyze
 
whatchanges are necessary and achievable will inevitably lead to program frustration
 
and cynicism among the rank and file ofthe organization as administrators attemptto
 
implementill-fitting or unobtainable programs.
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Aspolicing continues along its evolutionary path,Comhiunity Oriented Policing
 
philosophies and programsseem destined to be with us—bothin the civilian as well as
 
the AF conimunity. Assuch,caution should be exercised by those in positions of
 
leadership to ensure thatthe strategies or tactics pursued are appropriate for the situation
 
in whichthey are meantto operate. While it has been suggested thatCOP philosophies
 
and programs have been part^d parcel OfAFSP operationsfor quite sometime,the
 
degree to which this is true surely varies acrossAF installations and fluctuates with
 
changesin base and unitleadership. Because ofthe inherent variations among AF
 
Commandsand installations,issues dealing with COP should be dealt with atthe
 
highestlevelsofAFSP leadership in orderto receive adequate and unit-level attention.
 
The findings presented here should be viewed asalaimch pad for further,more
 
in depth analysis and study,and not asthe ultimate solution toimanswered questions
 
concerning COP mid the military environment. Particularly,more detailed research into
 
line persoimel knowledge regarding COP and the prevailing perception ofthe proper
 
role for the police in the AF community is encouraged asa starting pointthat will afford
 
a clearer understanding ofprecisely where the AFSPcommunity stands in its
 
continuing evolution. Withouta proper understanding ofwhere one is,it become
 
difficultto navigate the wayto where onedesires to be. Ultimately,correct
 
imderstanding,garnered through careful research and analysis,should resultin
 
thoughtful implementation ofadditional COP strategies or tactics and will enable AF
 
commandersto successfully lead their organizations through the gaxmtletofchange and
 
challenges thatlay before them.
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APPENDIXA
 
Survey results
 
Questions Individual Responses To Questions
 
Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Adopted COP? Yes No^ Yes Yes No^ Yes Yes Yes No 
Written Definition ofCOP? No No No No No Yes Yes No No 
Bike Patrol Yes Not Yes Yes No Yes Yes Not^ Yes 
Yet Yet 
FootPatrol Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Crime Prevention Program Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Resource Protection Prgm Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood Watch Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Town Meetings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
D.A.R.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Building Checks(After Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
hours;rattling doorknobs) 
Stray Animal Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Are Bike Patrol Officers No N/A No Yes N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes 
assigned to special section? 
Do Bike Patrol Officers Yes N/A No Yes N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes 
assigned permanent beats? 
Do Bike Patrol Officers Yes N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes 
receive special training? 
Supportofsupervisorsfor Mix"^ N/A Pos Pos N/A Pos Pos Mix^ Pos 
Bike Patrol Program 
Enthusiasm for Bike Patrol High N/A High High N/A High High High High 
from Line Personnel 
Support Received From Pos N/A Pos Pos N/A Pos° Pos N/A Pos 
Installation Commanders 
Type ofFeedback reeeived Pos N/A Pos Pos N/A Pos Pos N/A Pos 
from community residents 
^ Plans to implementCOP programs when current personnel shortages are overcome.
 
^ Base slated for closure before end of1995.
 
^ Plans to implementCOP programs when current personnel shortages are overcome.
 
Cited biggest obstacle coming from mid-level supervisors who were forced to fill bike patrol positions
 
over normal patrols even though current staffing levels did notsupportthe additional program.
 
^ See Footnote 4.
 
^ Hospital Commander investigating the possibility ofplacing one Emergency Medical Technician on
 
bicycle within the base housing area during certain hours to allow for swifter response in case ofinjury.
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